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Summary 
Justice, in the broadest sense of equality and fairness, is a cornerstone aspect 
of our abilities, as human beings, to lead individual lives in the way we 
choose according to what we see as the right or the good way to live.   
 
A catalyst for any debate over a theory of justice, Immanuel Kant’s work 
provides a fundamental basis from which we should begin to understand 
why society, with justice as a key aspect, is shaped in the way it is. His work 
has influenced many of the legal philosophers considered to provide seminal 
instantiations of justice. It is the work of these thinkers that carries great 
importance as a point of departure for reconceptualising an understanding of 
justice.  
 
The current system of International law privileges State authorities as the 
dominant ideology whose objective standards of justice are permitted to 
represent the moral identities of each individual found on their territories.  
However, in a modern day world, transnational issues affecting justice must 
lead us to believe that such a nationalist view is no longer sufficient. Issues 
including increasingly prevalent cross-border crime, government and non-
governmental regimes intent on systematically destroying the identities of 
individuals in favour of their own ideologies and the relative ease of ever-
increasing migration meaning our understanding of the ‘citizen’ no longer 
carries such relevance, suggests there is a need to reconceptualise justice 
processes. Not only should we ensure that individuals have the right to lead 
autonomous lives in tolerance of individual identity, but in the face of 
severe destruction to the quality of individual lives, any imbalance deserves 
effective redress. 
 
In respect of modern societal developments however, theory can only take 
us so far. Not to disregard the pertinence of justice-based theory, a balance 
must be struck between theoretical and empirical considerations to allow us 
to effectively respond to an ever-pressing need, not only to understand why 
justice needs to be reconceptualised, but most importantly, how to achieve 
it.  
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1 Introduction  
Justice in all its senses is a complex and vast forum where discussion has 
raged for centuries about its substantive content. Contextually, the human 
rights regime makes an attempt at ensuring a just society in the sense of 
equality and fairness. For the layperson however, a sense of justice, in a 
similar vein as a sense of human rights, is a term that often means 
something different to each individual. It is a term that each human being 
understands but is, on further reflection, unable to provide a concrete 
definition thereof. The sense of justice is quite simply, a notion inherent to 
the individual and is subject, undoubtedly to change according to social, 
economic and personal influences on the life of that individual. Any attempt 
at explaining what constitutes a sense of justice will often be substantiated 
with terms including, but not limited to, human rights, good, right, society, 
law, politics, objectivity and morality. The notion of justice, unlike any 
other component part of our lexis, is a notion entrenched so deeply in the 
concept of the self that the task to define justice, given these considerations, 
is extraordinarily complex. What results is that finding a consistent and 
workable narrative to support each individual understanding of justice is a 
task rendered seemingly only possible by the vague and uninformed.  
 
It is relatively simple to provide an abstract, yet coherent definition in which 
each individual can find his own understanding and adapt it to himself. But 
to do this would be to deeply undermine the importance of defining justice. 
Indeed the rationale behind the task to define justice is as important as the 
notion itself. Why is it so pertinent though? Surely, any definition engenders 
considerations that there must be attainable agreement. Partly, I will submit, 
this is because we are, at some level at least, altruistic individuals1 and in 
being as such, we find it necessary to define notions that deeply affect not 
                                                
1 Samuel Freeman, ‘Original Position’ (The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
Summer 2014) < http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-
bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=original-position> accessed 20 May 2015 
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only ourselves as individuals but also our community, politically, legally 
and in our day-to-day lives. However, it is the second part of that statement 
with which I am concerned. I submit that the notion of justice and the 
provision of such is so intrinsically linked to our ability to lead lives as 
functioning individuals, that in the absence of a workable and adaptable 
definition, the very concept of humanity would face destruction. To live in a 
society that we can define, in whichever way we choose, as a just society, is 
a cornerstone element of civilisation. Throughout history, we have 
witnessed societal attempts at providing justice. We have witnessed its 
apparition in the criminal, in the social, in the individual and in the political. 
Justice, I will submit, is so fundamental to enable us to function in our 
everyday lives as individuals that without a coherent understanding of its 
function, our ability to live our lives would be seriously impaired. And, 
perhaps most pertinently, when an individual feels that something is unjust, 
it cannot help but be felt that at some level, the basic structure of the society 
in which we live, has failed.  
 
The seriousness of the task of defining justice understood, it is now 
imperative to navigate the numerous understandings of justice in an attempt 
to provide substantive meaning to such teleological considerations of why 
we need justice. Overall, the somewhat standard definitions of justice to 
which we are accustomed have become, I will submit, dogmatic2 and have 
served to exacerbate tensions in a legal boxing match, where the winner is 
not defined as the one who throws the most punches, but instead the one 
whose punches are most pleasing to the audience. Legal philosophers in one 
corner are extremely protective of approaches to the notion of justice where 
universalism is the key element.3 In an open playing field where there is no 
need to be tied to concepts of territoriality, sovereignty, political bias or 
                                                
2 Satoshi Fukuma, ‘Rawls in Japan: A Brief Sketch of the Reception of John Rawls’ 
Philosophy’ (2014) 64:4 Philosophy East and West 887 
3 Such an understanding is promulgated primarily by the work of Immanuel Kant and has 
served as the basis for much theory on the subject of justice.  See further Immanuel Kant, 
Groundwork For The Metaphysics Of Morals (Allen W Wood tr, 1st edn, Yale University 
Press 2002) <http://www.inp.uw.edu.pl/mdsie/Political_Thought/Kant%20-
%20groundwork%20for%20the%20metaphysics%20of%20morals%20with%20essays.pdf
> accessed 26 May 2015. 
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efficiency, legal philosophers have developed their notions independent of 
the so-called reality of societal norms.4 Prima facie, their task seems more 
straightforward. However, as I will establish, what can result from such 
ontological arguments is that the overall definition becomes somewhat 
disconnected from the reality of global society. On the other hand, 
practitioners5 are confronted with the relativist task of conforming to pre-
established boundaries, both legal and political in recognition of the fact that 
the provision of justice should suitable for the multitudinous traditions, 
cultures and autonomous6 individuals existing within the societies in which 
they govern. If they fail, society fails.  
‘If…principles of justice are realized faithfully and consistently in our 
society, these principles will bring about a deep transformation in the 
contemporary political and social-economic situation.’7  
Dogmatic positioning on the concept of justice has I will submit, led to its 
semantic demise. The understanding of justice has been subjected to such an 
extraordinary quantity of definition attempts that it has almost become 
devoid of meaning. The purpose of this thesis therefore is to recalibrate an 
understanding of justice in order to lead the way in establishing a 
framework for the converging points between the philosophical and the 
social, political traditions. A point where the definitions converge 
substantially enough to provide us with a workable and adaptable 
understanding of justice to satisfy the needs and requirements of a modern 
day society.  
 
I will submit, following a Rawlsian view,8 we are born with a sense of 
altruism.9 Thus, even though, as previously stated, justice is a deeply 
individual concept, it is without a doubt due to an inherent human need to 
                                                
4 As an example, John Rawls’ theory of the original position is seen as utopian.  
5 I have used the notion of practitioners to refer to all those who are not legal philosophers. 
In other words, those who are connected by virtue of their professions to the day-to-day 
functioning of society.  
6 Here, I employ the Razian understanding of autonomy. See further Joseph Raz, The 
Morality of Freedom (Oxford 1986) chs 14-15 
7 Fukuma (n 2) 
8 Freeman (n 1). John Rawls’ philosophy is based on the idea that our individual attributes 
are luck-based and a just society is about redressing such imbalance.  
9 ibid 
 9 
belong that we feel a need to make our individual concepts of justice 
attainable for the community as a whole.10 Equally, our global state-centric 
normative foundation in which norms are promulgated by state authorities 
that do not distinguish between groups or individuals is suited to establish a 
convergence of individual norms suitable for promulgation to the entire 
community. In other words, a shared sense of justice, must in order to be 
appropriate for individuals found on the territory of a state, apply without 
prejudice. 
 
As a corollary, it is a true assertion to make that the necessity for a workable 
notion of justice itself provides us with a reason to assess its plausibility. In 
essence, our society requires laws to be just because, for one reason or 
another, we cannot all have what we want. I will discuss further the 
principles giving rise to this assertion further on in this paper. However, I 
will argue that an obsession with defining and making useful the concept of 
justice has given rise to acceptance of a philosophical understandings of 
justice on a level incompatible with modern day thinking. It may be noted at 
this point that I have avoided purposefully usage of the term ‘citizen’. This, 
as I will go on to establish is because many legal commentators, academics 
and philosophers use citizenship as a device for providing hegemony for a 
particular notion of justice.11 I will argue that this is no longer the case and 
is ultimately, not relevant to a recalibration of the notion suitable for 
adaptation in a modern day world. 
 
The need for such deliberation of theory and practice cannot be understated. 
Globally, the understanding of the nation state is changing and governments 
are no longer in a position of monopoly to promulgate laws and regulations 
that conform to one standard of justice. Instead, the effects of globalisation 
of legal culture has meant that as a global society, it is now more imperative 
                                                
10 Roy Baumeister and Mark Leary, ‘The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal 
Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation’ (1995) 117 Psychological Bulletin 497 
11 For an interesting overview of the relationship between justice and the citizen, see 
Andrew Mason, ’Citizenship and Justice’ (2011) 10 Politics, Philosophy and Economics 
263 and Margaret Somers, Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the 
Right to Have Rights (CUP 2008) 
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than ever to find a point of convergence that can fulfil our individual sense 
of justice, even when the norms promulgated by our governments fail to do 
so. The pertinence of a feeling of justice is so important that an objective 
promise to individuals must be made, regardless of State boundaries, that in 
situations where their own feelings of justice and safety in the face of threats 
to our capability to exercise our daily lives is menaced. We must ensure that 
justice remains a concept central to each individual and fundamental to the 
changing society in which we live. 
 
1.1 Delimitations 
The following paper is a qualitative, rather than quantitative examination of 
the concept of justice in relation to the way we live our lives as individuals. 
In this regard, I have not attempted to analyse and commensurate each and 
every definition of justice that has ever been provided.12 Indeed, to do so, 
would go far beyond the requirements of such a paper and would suffer as 
appearing as a mere listing of concepts and understanding. With a plethora 
of concepts containing so many various facets, it would be impossible to 
remain coherent in their examination. Instead, the following paper contains 
a critical examination of theories of justice stemming from the Kantian 
Enlightenment tradition.13 It is these theories that I feel represent most 
effectively the theoretical foundations on which we have built the dominant 
concept of the nation state and the dominant understanding that it is the state 
and state organs that are the ultimate interlocutors of justice. It is also these 
practitioners in whose works the link between human rights and justice is 
most apparent. In this regard, although the principle aim will be to examine 
                                                
12 For further works on the notion of justice, the work of Amartya Sen for example provides 
an interesting basis for a differing understanding of the concept. 
13 Robert Johnson, ’Kant’s Moral Philosophy’ (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Summer 2014) <plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/kant-moral/>  accessed  20 
May 2015. See further Immanuel Kant, Groundwork For The Metaphysics Of Morals 
(Allen W Wood tr, 1st edn, Yale University Press 2002) 
<http://www.inp.uw.edu.pl/mdsie/Political_Thought/Kant%20-
%20groundwork%20for%20the%20metaphysics%20of%20morals%20with%20essays.pdf
> accessed 26 May 2015. 
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the concept of justice in its entirety from its foundations, I have opted, in 
order to ensure coherence, to make some presuppositions about the link 
between justice and human rights. These will become apparent as the paper 
progresses; however, I have taken for granted the capability of human rights 
to provide the most appropriate arena for the most suitable instantiation of 
the notion of the ‘good,’ a notion, as we will see, tied heavily to the 
provision of justice. Equally, this paper should not be construed as a 
teleological analysis; I make the assumption that justice is a fundamental 
cornerstone of a functioning society for in the Mill-ian tradition,14 the 
marketplace of ideas is representative of the search for truth and the quantity 
of ideas that have dominated academic and political discourse surrounding 
the concept of justice is immense. For that reason, I permit myself the 
opportunity to take for granted the idea that justice is a principle that we, as 
a society and as individuals, need.  
 
The aim of the paper is to fill the theoretical deficit left by such divergence 
between theory and practice and will aim to propose criteria for the basis of 
any reconceptualisation of the notion of justice. 
 
In establishing my criteria, will use the following authors; Immanuel Kant, 
John Rawls, John Finnis, Friedrich von Hayek, Joseph Raz and Hannah 
Arendt. The discussion however will focus on those authors most directly 
influenced by the common good assertion of Kantian ethics. 
 
In order to achieve the complex task of navigating the well-trodden 
theoretical paths of justice definition, I will consider notions of objectivity 
and morality in an attempt to understand from what bases the legal 
philosophers on whose work we base much of today’s practice, purport to 
identify the criteria for establishing justice in the modern day world.  
Overall, it is through frustration with the notion of justice and the reality of 
its application in the modern day world that I have attempted to provide a 
                                                
14 Jill Gordon, ‘John Stuart Mill and the “Marketplace of Ideas”’ (1997) 23 Social Theory 
and Practice 235 
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coherent platform for the concept of justice to begin to make sense. The 
paper should serve as an Archimedean point from which the ontology of the 
notion of justice should be clear. It is, I will submit, only if we are able to 
clarify the foundations of justice that we will be capable of implementing 
centuries of debate in a modern world, without disavowing groups or 
individuals of their own senses of justice.  
1.2 Disposition 
To navigate the complexities of the various notions of justice, I will in 
chapter two provide an overview of the theories with which I am working 
and the debates with which I am concerning myself in order to provide room 
for a suitable recalibration of the theory of justice. I will also establish the 
link with human rights and the arena in which justice can most efficiently be 
fostered through human rights and legal mechanisms. In chapter three, I will 
problematize the issue of justice within the context of the theories 
established in chapter two and seek to establish an understanding of the 
outstanding issues in the modern day world that suffer at the hands of justice 
within the already established notions. I will then continue, in chapter four, 
to provide alternative empirically based theories that may guide the notion 
of justice to be more workable. In chapter five, I will seek to provide an 
overview of political solutions to justice and finally, in chapter six I will aim 
to come to a conclusion about the notion of justice and propose a workable 
standpoint from which justice can best be achieved. Such a standpoint will 
be tested not only for empirical functionality but also for theoretical quality.  
 
The debate surrounding the concept of justice has centred for too long 
around terminology that is out of date and stagnating15. The universality 
against cultural relativism debate is a highly prevalent and important debate 
in human rights, but its ubiquity is putting the proverbial brakes on the 
                                                
15 Anthony J Langlois, The Politics of Justice and Human Rights: Southeast Asia and 
Universalist Theory (CUP 2001) 123 
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progression of any effective enforcement mechanism for providing justice.16 
We are stuck between philosophical and political tensions, where more 
theory seems to be the only answer to establish some form of consensus. All 
in an attempt to establish the best method for providing justice in a modern 
world without disenfranchising groups, communities and religions whose 
faith in their individual convictions provide a fundamental basis for the way 
in which they lead their lives but at the same time not succumbing to 
unbridled relativism.17  
 
1.3 An ideal theory of Justice 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 – The starting point construction of a workable theory for justice  
 
 
In Figure 2 above, I submit my construction of what would be required from 
an ideal theory of justice. Aware that the components are in part self-
                                                
16 ibid 115-116 
17 Cass Sunstein, ‘Incompletely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law’ (2007) 
74 Social Research 1  
 
Workable	  DeﬁniSon	  
of	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ImplementaSon	  
ObjecSvity	  
SubjecSvity	  
Reason	  
Morality	  
UncondiSonality	  
 14 
contradictory, the figure should seek to represent the pluralism of a modern 
day world and thus I will attempt to respond accordingly.  
 15 
2 Overview of the Justice 
Problem  
The question as to what justice is has undoubtedly by now attained quasi-
adage status. It is useful in the pursuit of an answer to firstly deconstruct the 
accepted visual representation of justice. Adorning courthouses and 
governmental buildings globally is the image of Lady Justice; a blindfolded 
Goddess, carrying a sword and scales. Since the Roman times, such 
iconography has been used to represent Reason (the sword), the balance of 
arguments (the scales), and, since the 15th Century, the blindfold that is 
representative of objectivity. Together with her Goddess-like attributes, 
Lady Justice is seen to represent what justice means. In terms of being 
useful in a modern day world, objectivity, equality and reason are all 
evidently key facets of a legal system, and equally, facets most commonly 
found in human rights discourse. At the very least, the depiction of justice as 
such represents justice as fairness; a key element, as we will go on to see, of 
John Rawls’ politically liberal theory of justice.18  
As an alternative argument, however, and one on which the foundations of 
the problematisation of justice exists, is proposed by Cass Sunstein. 
Sunstein refutes such a depiction of justice. He states that most importantly, 
justice is not a single figure, not blind and certainly incapable of balancing 
human goods in manner suitable to be depicted as a scale.19 Sunstein’s 
response is a reaction to the neo-Kantian ideology of justice that we will go 
on to examine in chapter three. However, his refusal of the traditional image 
of justice demonstrates the tensions that exist in the discourse surrounding 
the topic. In essence, he states that justice must represent much more than 
can be confined to a single representation in the form of a Goddess, and 
                                                
18 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 1971) 3 
19 Cass Sunstein, ‘Incompletely Theorized Agreements’ (1995) 108 Harvard Law Review 
1733 
 16 
each of these considerations must be weighed in order to provide an 
accurate and workable account of the notion of justice.  
 
 
Fig. 1 – The Justice Problem: The second lending itself to the image of 
Lady Justice.20  
 
Indeed, for centuries, the concept of justice has consistently received both 
political and scholarly attention in attempt to inject some substantive 
content into a notion that, as I have argued, has become devoid of meaning. 
The development of a useful concept of justice has led to legal philosophers 
attempting to define a notion of justice suiting to all regardless of individual 
characteristics. Practitioners on the other hand have been faced with the task 
of defining justice in numerous contexts in order to ensure that individuals 
can live day-to-day lives with a sense of justice. These are tasks, as we will 
go on to establish that are strived for by the human rights project.  
Making useful the concept of justice has given rise to widespread hegemony 
of philosophical understandings of justice on a level arguably incompatible 
with modern day thinking.  
On the one hand, influenced by the Kantian tradition, legal philosophers 
such as John Rawls,21 Hannah Arendt and John Finnis have attempted to 
                                                
20 According to Langlois (n 15) 110 
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provide a narrative that makes society ‘fair.’ On the other hand, those who 
reject the Kantian tradition establish a compromise that does not require a 
single narrative for protection of justice. The practitioners who must 
promulgate norms in order to achieve justice are stuck in a void between the 
two. In other words, not only do they try to achieve a common, universal 
standard, but at the same time, must conform to the realities of a State-based 
model of law.  
 
2.1 Justice, Politics, Law and Human 
Rights 
As it has previously been established, this paper will examine the notion of 
justice through its relationship with human rights. It is in this normative 
arena that notions of justice have been most discussed. It goes significantly 
beyond the scope of this paper to establish the exact nature of the link 
between justice and law, although some clarification on the topic will be 
provided for in the following paragraphs. As a paper grounded in the 
provision of justice through legal mechanisms, it will be assumed in order to 
provide a consistent narrative, that justice in whichever way in which it is 
understood can be best accommodated by legal mechanisms. It is 
undisputed that in the current model of the nation State being sovereign over 
its citizens, the norms promulgated by the State authorities and adjudicated 
upon by judges, as organs of the State are the norms that are currently in 
place to satisfy individual and communal notions of justice. I will go on to 
establish why this is so important, however, the provision of justice in the 
form of human rights instruments is premised on the idea of the nation State 
as the provider of the conditions for justice to flourish through promulgated 
norms. Thus, the relationship of justice and law will not be further 
elaborated upon.  
 
                                                                                                                        
21 John Rawls sets out his principles for fairness and explains the relationship with Kantian 
philosophy in A Theory of Justice (n 18) preface 
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It is however important to make a distinction between distributive and 
corrective justice as such provides the foundations for the rest of the paper. 
The definition of which I find most clearly expressed by William Lamont 
who states that ‘Distributive Justice is the creation of a system of rights (and 
consequently of duties and obligations) according to the principle of 
'equality of consideration' for all; and 'rights 'are protected fields for activity 
within which individuals or groups may pursue their interests. Corrective 
Justice comes into operation when the scheme created by distributive justice 
has been infringed; and it may take the form either of Reparation or of 
Punishment.’22 The following paper advocates for a tool in order to prevent, 
as far as possible, the need for correctional justice.  
 
The key concept on which we will focus is the relationship between justice 
and human rights, for it is human rights that are often seen as the vessel 
through which justice can be best achieved in the distributive sense.  
As previously mentioned, for the layperson, an attempt to describe the 
notion of justice will incorporate lexis including the good, dignity, and 
morality in addition to equality. As justice is often inexorably linked to the 
concept of what is good, and by association, human rights is also heavily 
tied to the notion of what is good, I will firstly seek to establish an 
acceptable notion of what is good within the context of a legal system (to fit 
in with the concepts of justice and law) which will, in turn, demonstrate the 
reasoning for which the provision of justice is most representative through 
human rights discourse and language.  
 
 
 
                                                
22 William D Lamont, ‘Justice: Distributive and Corrective’ (1941) 16 The Journal of the 
British Institute of Philosophy 3 
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2.2 Tackling the Concept of what is Good 
(morality and objectivity) 
 
As far as justice and human rights are debated concepts, to develop an 
understanding of what is objectively good we must navigate an 
amalgamation of considerations, both individual and communal. For that 
reason, and for the purposes of developing a meaning to communal values, I 
will examine the notion in relation to the work of John Finnis. Finnis, a 
natural lawyer, believes, in contrast to legal positivists, that there is a link 
between law and morality and that any legal system must be based upon 
moral principles as well as social norms in order to function as a legal 
system.23 This incorporates the understanding that the provision of justice is 
key to the effective functioning of any legal system.  
Finnis’ critique stands as a critique of the nature of law that I will apply to 
the context of justice and human rights. He states that the test for the 
validity of law requires taking into account morality as well as the sources 
of law. He frames morality as a set of seven ‘goods’ that, he claims are 
objectively true.24 As we will go on to see, objectivity is an underlying issue 
in all the discourse surrounding justice, however, like Rawls and Kant, 
Finnis recognises in his seven goods that there must be some objectivity in a 
legal system that seeks to commensurate supposedly incommensurable 
values.  
 
Finnis’ theory serves to establish the conditions for good legislation. He 
states, in recognition of plurality, that to pass a law is not unrelated to 
morality but is to promote some sort of human purpose in morality. Finnis 
relates the human aspect to law to the concept of the good in a legal system. 
In doing so, he does assume that the average individual’s moral values are 
                                                
23 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2001) ch 
1 
24 ibid 
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good.25 This could be theoretically overcome by Anthony Langlois’ 
assertion that rules for justice should be discursive but not arbitrary;26 
however, this will be discussed further on in the paper.  
What is clear is that Finnis’ objective conception of the good pays great 
attention to what is of value to each individual. A most just law he contends 
will be more capable of fulfilling his seven objective goods, if it pays 
attention to individual values. To overcome inconsistencies in the moral 
agenda of each individual however, Finnis establishes a mechanism for 
control. He proposes that the ideal individual’s viewpoint is the viewpoint 
that promotes his seven goods, and that is how to establish what should be 
the most just instantiation of the law. In other words, in comparing such a 
‘perfect’ viewpoint with other viewpoints of those who do not hold, 
arguably, perfect viewpoints because their views do not fulfil his seven 
objective goods, he proposes, it can only then be understood what a just law 
is.  
In sum, Finnis’ understanding of the law proposes common goods, which 
the perfect law will take into account, and it is only if a person’s viewpoint 
values those common goods that it will be a just law.27  
Indeed, for Finnis, law is a requirement of one of his seven goods; the 
‘practically reasonable point of view.’ His seven goods28 cannot be realised 
alone and therefore the law provides a ‘practically reasonable point of view’ 
to coordinate common activity between individuals, thus resolving any 
potential conflict.  
For Finnis, the notion of what is good therefore is a norm that promulgates 
seven goods, known collectively as moral evaluative objective criteria. 
Human rights undoubtedly claim to do the same. Human rights, for Finnis, 
would help us to develop those seven goods29 by coordinating our activity 
and individual viewpoints.  
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I will go on to establish the importance of a defining such a global definition 
of justice, however, for natural lawyers like Finnis, there is a scale of legal 
systems defining their ability to protect the seven goods. In extreme 
examples, (Finnis uses the example of the Nazi regime30) the seven goods 
are destroyed and thus, such a legal system cannot constitute a just system 
for it focuses on destroying the seven moral criteria that make a society 
objectively good. Finnis sees this as a spectrum that includes at one end, the 
focal meaning of law (a just society) and descending from this instantiation, 
variations that fail to meet the focal meaning of what is objectively good.  
 
Finnis attempts further on in his essays to answer the pluralism debate.31 He 
is aware that the set of goods he proposes are incommensurable; he believes 
that each manner of living life will undoubtedly create conflict. As I have 
already submitted, no individual has the same understanding of justice. 
However, Finnis’ argument is that law becomes a requirement of ‘practical 
reasonableness’ as it provides a structure through institutional mechanisms 
that in turn permit the individual to live by the seven goods.  
 
Finnis’ theory is useful for a de facto understanding of the relationship 
between justice and law, and justice and human rights. His theory also 
allows us to garner a deeper understanding of concepts necessary to tackle 
when attempting to establish a workable theory of justice. Both morality and 
objectivity are claims that have been debated within justice theory along 
with the roles they play in ensuring a system is just. I will go on to examine 
these criteria further on in the paper.  
 
Now that we are capable of understanding that there is strong theoretical 
relationship between human rights and justice, I will advance that empirical 
implementation only serves to exacerbate matters further.  
Depending on the basic understanding of human rights to which one 
subscribes, the gradual hardening of the notion of rights inherent to each 
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individual human began internationally with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights on the 10th December 194832 as a response to the atrocities of 
World War II. As the first statement concretising the notion of human 
rights, and most importantly the obligation on States to respect human 
rights, the UDHR has arguably concretised into customary international 
law,33 thus binding States to the obligations created therein. In its preamble, 
the UDHR states that ‘inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world.’34 Notably, this was the first declaration that tied the 
notion of human rights to the notion of justice. The relationship of human 
rights and justice was concretised at that moment and repeatedly reproduced 
in all human rights instruments and in the Charter of the United Nations.35 It 
seems logical that the notions of human rights and justice therefore go hand 
in hand, and that any understanding of justice should seek to hold a similar 
function to human rights; to create the conditions for human dignity, 
equality and fairness to flourish, theoretically represented in Finnis’ work.  
 
Evidently, the concept of justice was debated long before any discussion of 
human rights. As Jack Donnelly states, ‘Plato, Burke, and Bentham all had 
theories of distributive justice, yet no one would ever think to suggest that 
they advocated human rights.’36 However, justice since the Kantian tradition 
has always had a link to fairness and equality, and similarly, these are the 
principles that the human rights instruments seek to protect. If we accept 
that justice, in some vein, is about fairness, then Donnelly’s argument has 
some strength. He states that the ‘recognition and protection of human rights 
will…open up lines of communication between people and government, 
spur the provision of basic services through the recognition of economic and 
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social rights, and provide to dispossessed groups regular and important 
channels for demanding redress.’37 To what extent human rights and justice 
can be equated to fairness will go on to be established, however, the 
consistent reiteration of the notion of justice in human rights instruments 
must lead us to believe that justice is an aim of human rights and thus the 
two are inextricably linked.  
 
The problem with human rights when regarded as a vessel for the provision 
of justice is that, as Cass Sunstein points out, the human rights project is 
highly suited to what I have represented in the bottom circle (See Fig. 1).38 
Human rights, due to the necessity to ‘fit in’ with a State-centric political 
promulgation of norms, must fit in with one image of justice. They are a 
product of a specific time, place and political agenda as Sunstein points out 
and therefore can never be truly universal or provide a just, in the sense of 
equal, view. They are subject, as Sunstein considers, to the same critiques as 
the iconic image of justice,39 elaborated upon in the first part of this paper.  
 
2.3 The Politics of Human Rights 
It is worth briefly noting the background of the human rights project and 
some of the arguments relating to their implementation. This will provide us 
with the necessary foundation for proceeding with an understanding of how 
justice can best be implemented. Indeed, one of the cornerstones of the 
relevant debate surrounding the human rights regime as instruments for 
providing equality and fairness to each individual is the universality and 
cultural relativism debate. This debate, as we will go to establish, is 
extremely pertinent to justice discourse because it requires some analysis of 
the capability of human rights to attach themselves to the individuals whom 
they purport to protect, whilst remaining universal.  
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The debate is substantiated mostly with claims that universalism is a product 
of Western imperialism and thus norms which do not necessarily ‘fit’ within 
the by-product of Western thought regarding how the world should be run, 
are not worthy of the human rights regime.40 
 
We should remain aware that although particularly pertinent to the justice 
debate, the centre of my argument is focused on relativism; avoiding the 
disenfranchisement of minority cultures with an overarching view of human 
rights. Instead, I argue that this undermines the very notion of justice.  
 
I will go on to establish, in hegemony of the theory put forward by Anthony 
Langlois,41 that the universality debate is unsolvable and what instead 
should be protested against is that human rights are ‘a philosophy of the 
nature of humankind’ but instead as a political tool for implementing values 
where they agree. This provides some effective convergence on the useful of 
human rights and avoids the universality debate.  
 
However, before I seek to provide a vantage point for overcoming the issues 
justice faces, it would be prudent to problematise supported justice theory. 
The universality debate is a debate that interestingly finds its foundations in 
the theory of justice itself. 
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3 What is the issue with the  
Kantian tradition? 
 
The vast quantity of debate centred on implementing a workable notion of 
justice can be traced to the Enlightenment era of Kantian ethics. Indeed, the 
works of authors dealt with in this paper have been influenced even 
remotely by Kantian ethics and have proposed theories flowing from the 
ideology based on concepts in which universalism and objectivity are strong 
corollaries. Such an understanding of Kantian ethics, for modern day 
authors critical of Enlightenment theory represents an ‘undermining of the 
hope of justice by reducing it to the scope of one ideology.’42 
 
Kantian theory is vast. And it is far beyond the aim of this paper to provide 
a critical examination of each of its facets. Indeed, even authors influenced 
by his work have not, by their own admission, performed a copy-paste 
exercise of his works.43 However, it seems prudent to provide an overview 
of his theory in relation to a theory of justice. 
 
The key aspect of Kantian ethics that I wish to discuss further is, and which 
is evident in many of the works influenced therefrom is the aspect that Kant 
considers the fundamental basis of our moral duties. He calls this the 
Categorical Imperative.44 Kant’s Categorical Imperative incorporates 
notions of objectivity and morality into the reasons for which we act as 
human beings. It is an imperative to act, regardless of individual morality 
and it applies to us as human beings, unconditionally by virtue of our nature 
as rational agents.45 As Julia Driver points out, the imperatives classed as 
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Categorical are binding because they are based on reason, rather than 
contingent facts about an individual.46 In contrast, the Hypothetical 
Imperative is a command that is based on the individual desires of an 
individual. In contrast to the CI, it is not binding but allows us to satisfy a 
want if we choose to follow the imperative.  It is however only the CI that is 
morally binding and, thus, from a modern stance, it is the CI forms the basis 
of law.  
 
Arguably, the first formulation of the CI in terms of universality47 was in his 
seminal work, ‘Groundwork’. In his writings, Kant states that an individual 
must ‘act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the 
same time will that become a universal law.’48 A reason for acting must 
effectively ‘pass’ four steps in order to be morally permissible to act. 
Although it is unnecessary to discuss each of the four steps, most saliently, 
one of those four steps requires an alteration of reason for action in the 
context of a universal law and only permits morally valid action in the event 
that the action could provide a universal basis in ‘a world governed by this 
law of nature.’49 Most pertinently, Kant’s position is reliant on the idea that 
it would not be permissible to act in a certain way if that act were self-
contradictory once established as a universal norm.  
 
Evidently, the Kantian influence on principles underlying the nature of 
justice is vast. For, this is exactly the problem. He states that Enlightenment 
ethics makes assumptions about the competence of reason to be objective, 
‘to establish neutral rules and independent criteria and to search out and tell 
an account of the universal history of humanity.’50 Langlois’ critique of 
Kant is illustrative of a prevailing lack of relevance to the modern day 
world. Underlying his critique is the understanding that it would be an 
almost insultingly reductive to assume that reason is capable of being 
objective; the idea that a human being’s reason for action cannot be reduced 
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to the universal for each individual has their own concept of morality. As 
John Finnis states, what is morally reasonable for one person may not be 
morally reasonable for all.51 The Kantian tradition fails in the face of 
modern considerations of what we require from a workable notion of 
justice. As Langlois states, we should be ‘aiming at returning thinking about 
justice to that which witnesses the power of ideas to enhance the lives of the 
marginalised and oppressed.’52 
 
Joseph Raz provides an interesting alternative to the universality debate, 
again demonstrably influenced by the Kantian ethical tradition. I will, for 
the sake of my argument, outline Raz’s theory of what is law and apply that 
to the Kantian perspective. Joseph Raz, as a hard positivist believes that for 
a legal system to function, it must be authoritative.53 However, described as 
a hard positivist, Raz refutes the natural lawyer’s claim that there is any 
relationship between the law and morality. Raz considers that if an 
individual inside a legal system must resort to his or her own personal 
morality in order to make a decision about the validity of a norm, that legal 
norm cannot be considered authoritative and therefore, it is legally invalid.54 
Although this permits some form of authoritative universality, it fails to take 
into account the traditions, culture and morality of each individual, 
affirming the State as the ultimate arbiter of justice in providing one 
singular view of the way in which an individual should live their life. 
Evidently, I submit, in problematising justice, any authority claimed by the 
law that does not take account of individuals whom it affects, fails to be a 
completely just system. Thus, we encounter the same issue as encountered 
in the Enlightenment tradition of justice. The problem is, as many 
commentators have established, that we cannot reduce X number of 
ideologies to one ideology without disenfranchising at least one group in 
society, thus evidently not providing the conditions for a just, equal and fair 
society.  
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In sum, Kant’s Categorical Imperatives highlights a link between justice and 
law based on adjusted individual morality to suit universal values. Finnis 
believes true individual morality is when it conforms to his understanding of 
what is commonly regarded as good. Finally, Raz’s argument is that 
individual moral reasoning is irrelevant for law. In this regard, we witness a 
scale useful to deconstruct objectivity, morality, and subjectivism.  
 
3.1 The Kantian Influence – are politicians 
or theorists to blame? 
 
American political philosopher John Rawls is regarded as one of the 
prevalent voices on the notion of justice.55 His theories of justice as fairness 
and political liberalism are theories that have provided the theoretical basis 
for animating liberalist democracies in the implementation of an 
overarching notion of justice for their citizens. David Gordon, writing in the 
American Conservative notes that Rawls’ maître d’oeuvre, his ‘Theory of 
Justice’ was at the time of its publication, the ‘most important work in 
moral philosophy since the end of World War II.’56 The prevalence of his 
work in both legal and political traditions has led to a plethora of critiques 
that have deconstructed Rawls’ theory in applying it to the modern day. 
Rawls even stated awareness of the limitations of his theory in his work 
‘Political Liberalism’ where he makes it clear that it fails in the face of 
International Law,57 because it conforms to specific political agenda present 
only at State level. This is exactly the Archimedean point from which I will 
look at Rawls’ theory. It is an onerous task, in a world where the rate of 
globalisation is rampant, to maintain the relevance of a theory that purports 
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to incorporate notions of objectivity at State level, but from a closer reading 
arguably fails to do so in a cohesive, relevant manner.  
 
Given the saliency of Rawls’ account of justice, I shall now seek to provide 
a comprehensive understanding of his theory in relation to the task of 
problematising justice in the modern day climate. I will assess Rawls’ 
theory in light of the critique presented by Friedrich Hayek, also a liberalist 
thinker, whose critique of Rawlsian justice is centred on the Hayekian 
understanding justice as a ‘social mirage.’58 
 
3.2 Rawlsian and Hayekian perceptions of 
Justice 
As Kantian theory, Rawls’ theory of justice is complex and incorporates, 
through his writings; diverging ideas that seek to form the basis of a 
politically liberal conception of justice. I will firstly look at his theory 
flowing from ‘A Theory of Justice’ and then continue to examine his theory 
in ‘The Law of the Peoples’ and ‘Political Liberalism’. 
The Rawlsian tradition of justice is based, firstly on the concept of 
distributive fairness and secondly on the concept of a politically liberal 
society. The notion of justice is a prevalent issue for Rawls, and at the start 
of his work ‘A Theory of Justice’, he states that justice is the ‘first virtue of 
social institutions.’59 I submit that Rawls’ theory is interesting to analyse 
because of his attachment to a strongly liberal theory of justice. In his work, 
he challenges other liberal thinkers who do not necessarily dispense with the 
idea of justice but do want to limit its role. A Rawlsian understanding of 
justice is heavily linked with notions of fairness and objectivity, but less, as 
previous thinkers, with morality.  
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Rawls believes in a concept of distributive justice behind a veil of 
ignorance60 which concerns the idea that true equality can only be 
established if we as human beings are unaware of the share of the human 
market that we will receive in the first place. His critique is based on the 
idea that the State must follow a framework in order to provide distributive 
justice for the citizens of that State. In other words, Rawls’ theory can be 
reduced to a universalist standpoint. What will become apparent through 
using Rawls in defining justice in modern day society is that he believes that 
what is right should come before what is good, and society should be made 
just, by adhering to the right before it adheres to the good. In this way, 
Rawls avoids the notion of individual morality and individual conceptions 
of what it means to lead a good life, which it should be noted, stands in stark 
contrast to the view of John Finnis.  
 
Contrastingly, for a philosopher like Friedrich Hayek, justice is not about 
the economic aspects of society as Rawls states, but rather is concerned 
where one individual intentionally transgresses the rights of another 
person.61 For Hayek, justice can only be explained in the presence of 
intentional action. Unlike Rawls, Hayek approaches individual acts in 
society and states that the aggregate outcome or the distribution of wealth is 
neither unjust nor just because it is unintended.62 It is an unforeseen 
outcome of X number of individual intentional acts. For Hayek, if justice 
can only occur through intentional action, then the outcomes of the share we 
receive cannot be regarded as a matter of justice.63  
In other words, in terms of human rights it is only when a human rights 
instrument unfairly favours one group over another in society that that 
intention will constitute an unjust action. Natural differences between 
individuals are not constitutive of injustice.  
                                                
60 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (n 18) 118 
61 Friedrich Hayek, Law Legislation and Liberty, Volume 2: The Mirage of Social Justice 
(vol. 2 Routledge and Kegan Paul 1976) 
62 Lister (n 58) 
63 Professor Lord Raymond Plant, 'Liberal Government: Justice' (King's College London, 
2013). 
 
 31 
Hayek states that the natural distribution of wealth (as an example) in 
society is something caused by the fact that we have no workable criteria for 
distributive justice but rather vague theoretical notions.64 In other words, if 
some individuals are rich and some are poor, that is nothing to do with 
justice. I submit that human rights, under the Hayekian tradition form a 
control mechanism in which to correct the balance. In contrast to Rawls, 
Hayek proposes a corrective intentional framework caused by uneven 
distribution. Although for Hayek an uneven distribution of wealth is not 
relevant to justice because it is the result of unintentional action, surely this 
would mean that human rights instruments seek to ‘tip the balance’ in 
favour of a more just system.  
Hayek maintains that justice and injustice are irrelevant to societal 
distribution due to natural fact. He claims that the human market is very 
likely to reward the natural abilities that each individual has. And these are 
likely to be even more extravagantly rewarded in a market where the State 
plays no role. For that reason, Hayek states that we must regard the market 
as morally arbitrary.65 The distribution of talent is a result of a genetic 
lottery and an individual cannot claim to deserve something on the basis of 
considerations over which there can be no control.66 Justice or injustice is 
created where there is intention to alter that distribution. 
 
For Rawls, justice is created where that distribution is already unfair. 
 
Hayek would most certainly agree therefore that human rights allow states 
to exercise control over the distribution of rights to their citizens, redressing 
the balance and making the system more just.  
In fact, in his work, Hayek goes on to say that, what is just and unjust is the 
way in which society deals with natural facts. A purely market order would 
accept differences between individuals as a reflection of natural facts and 
will go on to say that for this reason, people deserve the rewards.67  
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Overall Hayek’s argument incorporates the idea that justice is purely a 
matter of intention and an understanding of what is just, and unjust is about 
how a society responds to those facts. Hayek’s argument aids us in 
clarifying the Rawlsian approach to justice.  
 
The Hayekian view is an important aspect to gaining an understanding of a 
workable notion of justice because it provides us with a comparative tool for 
understanding the Rawlsian politically liberal concept of justice.  
Rawls’ theory is that justice is important for two reasons, one of which I 
have already advanced in the opening of this paper. Firstly, because we as 
human beings are beings with a degree of altruism, and secondly because 
we can do far more together than we can do separately.68 
For Rawls, if we are concerned about whether or not we receive a fair and 
equal share of the market, or in our case, whether the rights that are 
bestowed on us are bestowed equally, then, we as individuals must be 
concerned about the nature of justice.69 Rawls’ theory does not attempt to 
advance a view about the exact nature of the justice itself. Instead his work 
is focused on an attempt to understand how to have criteria for distributive 
justice in a society in which the social product is collaborative. Rawls’ 
understanding of the notion of justice is important because he states that 
society is based on concepts of collaboration and cooperation. It is only 
through objectivity of reason that we can ensure justice in the distributive 
sense. 
 
As previously stated, for Rawls, the only way to ensure a fair and just 
society is for the right to prevail over the good. Indeed, he maintains that 
there must be some kinds of impartial justification in order to avoid the self-
interest individuals have in following their own conception of what is good.  
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In order to do this, Rawls establishes that there must be a fair set of 
principles that allow the State to overlook the personal attributes of each 
individual.70  
Rawls hypothesizes the situations in which an individual would be able to 
form a general idea of justice, from behind their veil of ignorance, by 
overlooking but not ignoring their own personal values and conception of 
what is good.71 He says that individuals would favour equal liberty. In other 
words, under the veil of ignorance, individuals would be unaware of which 
social end of the distribution they would be, they would choose principles 
which would protect the position of the worst off. In this regard, Rawls 
argues, no particular person would receive a favourable distribution and 
society would be just. 
 
In application to a modern day context, the idea would be that a just society 
would be a society governed by laws under which an individual is unaware 
in advance to what extent they would be a beneficiary of those laws. 
Fairness in this sense is to adopt a principle under a veil of ignorance. 
 
In restating his theory in ‘Political Liberalism’, Rawls makes a clear attempt 
at addressing the various problems associated with pluralism in a modern 
society that have formed the basis of my examination thus far.72 Rawls’ 
theory in practice is to state that justice is a fundamental aspect to any 
society and in order to implement the notion, the social and political 
institutions are in place to create a suitable framework. In other words, in 
the context of diversity of moral values, Rawls attempts to create a 
mechanism for achieving just laws. He sees his work as the striking of a 
balance between diversity and necessity.73 
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Although Rawlsian theory has been critiqued by scholars and practitioners 
alike as being an idealistic notion of justice that is unworkable, Rawls is 
clear on his assertion that we live in a world of modern scarcity, not in a 
world of abundance. Indeed, if this were true, there would be no need to 
even discuss the notion of justice because we would all get what we 
wanted.74  
 
The ultimate difference for the purposes of this essay between the two 
liberal thinkers is their idea of the role of the State. Hayek’s view tends 
towards demonstrating the illusory aspect to the Rawlsian tradition. He 
maintains that the luck of the draw is something that has nothing to do with 
justice because it is unintended. Rawls states that Hayek’s view would lead 
to a society underpinned a set of entirely morally arbitrary attributes over 
which we have no control. Hayke maintains that there should be no barriers 
in society stopping people from achieving what they want. Rawls’ view is 
that the attributes are associated with luck and so the only way to ensure 
justice is to pass laws that remove the lottery of each individual’s draw in 
the social market.75  
Rawls bases his view on the ideas that we must find a moral framework 
without accepting the Hayekian viewpoint that the outcomes of the markets 
are unintentional and therefore nothing to do with justice.  
 
Couched in terms of human rights, for Rawls, it is important to provide a 
compensatory mechanism for those who end up in a worse position. 
 
However, Rawls’ argument goes further than that. He states, in a similar 
vein to the work of John Finnis that despite the existence of pluralism, we 
are capable of identifying a range of primary goods that each individual 
needs in order to pursue their perception of the good. Justice, for Rawls is 
about the distribution of those goods.  
                                                
74 ibid 
75 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (n 18) 276 
 35 
Access to these goods should be equal and thus for Rawls, the government 
cannot allow access to be down to a morally arbitrary distribution of 
attributes. There must be some kind of compensatory justice mechanism in 
place to reshape.  
In explanation of his theory, Rawls does not suggest that each member of a 
society will recognise the fundamentalist value of these ideas. Instead, he 
advances, in ‘Political Liberalism’ a theory of reflective equilibrium, stating 
that ‘if each member reflected carefully and fully upon his or her political 
beliefs, he or she should judge, in reflective equilibrium, that this set of 
ideas in fact embodies the values that he or she views as fundamental.’76 
 
Rawlsian theory is best reflected in a universalist conception of human 
rights therefore. In a just society, rules and laws will restrict the cost of 
failure and will put a limit on equality in order to ensure that every citizen 
can live together as citizens of the same kind of society. The emphasis on 
the Rawlsian tradition is the emphasis on the same. Undoubtedly influenced 
by the Kantian tradition, Rawls attempts to provide an answer to the justice 
problem by promulgating laws that promote sameness.  
 
3.3 The Rawlsian restatement: Why is 
Rawls so unworkable? 
Despite Rawls’ prevalence as a great liberalist thinker, it is difficult to 
ignore the plethora of critique levelled at his theories. I submit that in a 
modern globalised world, not only is the need for just laws and policies 
greater than ever, but the conception of justice deriving itself from the 
Kantian tradition of universal principles serves only to disenfranchise large 
classes of society.  
My process of deliberation regarding the theories of legal philosophers 
focuses principally on the presupposition of a notion of territoriality or 
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nationalism. I can’t help but feel that the effects of globalisation serve to 
break down the traditions of a State-centric world for providing justice. This 
is the reason for which I believe there is an increased pertinence in making 
sense of theories of justice.  
 
Before I make my opening gambit concerning the issue of territoriality, it 
would be prudent to assess the shortcomings of modern day instantiations of 
the Kantian traditions. Indeed, as many critics of Rawls have established in 
problematising Rawlsian theory, primarily, it prioritises communal State-
centric values over those of the individual.  
It is important to state at this point that although Rawls has always remained 
a liberalist, his theory underwent a vast restatement from his position in ‘A 
Theory of Justice’ to his position in ‘Political Liberalism’. Rawls rewrote 
his theory to further develop his thoughts on cultural values.77 He no longer 
proposes a theory of justice free from the pressures of the real world, but 
instead gives an account of a political theory of liberty. This is summarised 
well by Japanese philosopher Kawamoto who in his study on Rawls 
expresses the idea that Rawls makes a ‘shift from an ideal theory of justice 
to real politics in light of a variety of global social changes in the 1990s 
including, inter alia, the Gulf War and the abolition of apartheid in South 
Africa.’78 This has served to reduce Rawlsian theory to the political 
liberalist criteria for justice that we understand today.  
 
In this restatement, Rawls refutes ‘claims to universal truth, or claims about 
the essential nature and identity of persons’79 Alexander Kaufman argues 
that such an antithesis to his previous works constitutes a mere retraction of 
his theory in order ‘ensure political stability by appealing to the situated 
views of actual citizens’.80 Kaufman argues that paradoxically, Rawls’ 
theory must ‘make any concessions necessary to assure that each citizen will 
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find the theory acceptable’.81 In explanation of his theory, Rawls does not 
suggest that each member of a society will recognise the fundamentalist 
value of these ideas. Instead, he advances a theory of reflective equilibrium, 
stating that if each member reflected carefully and fully upon his or her 
political beliefs, he or she should judge, in reflective equilibrium, that this 
set of ideas in fact embodies the values that he or she views as 
fundamental.’82 As such, objective morality is prized over the subjective.  
 
The debate over the universalist nature of the Rawlsian tradition is derived 
from a Communitarian critique. Communitarians stress the importance of 
particularist values, maintaining that universalist values, first and foremost, 
are unjustified if they are not linked with a form of moral community. 
Equally, communitarians maintain that the Rawlsian method of deriving 
values from abstract principles such as his veil of ignorance is incoherent 
because it does not take into account a community-based view of morality. 
Communitarians disavow the role of the State in this sense because they 
believe that it is not the role of the State to interference with the 
community’s morality.83  
The Communitarian position however is often criticised as being too 
relative.  
 
However, as I will go on to establish, too much relativism in the 
Communitarian sense, may lead to an uncontrolled sense of relativism 
where the State has no role. In attempting to provide a workable role for 
justice to play, it must be conceded that the State has a central role to play in 
addressing imbalances between communities and individualist, thus 
requiring a compromise between the liberalist and the communitarian 
critiques of justice.  
 
Professor Petersmann in his article on Theories of Justice and Human Rights 
puts the argument against Rawls squarely in the context of relativist 
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critique.84 He states that ‘Rawlsian justice, in the sense of the way in which 
the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and 
determine the division of advantages from social cooperation, continues to 
differ from country to country.’85 He concedes that Rawls’ fundamental 
principles may be universally agreed upon, however, states that there is little 
coherency between other principles differing between cultures. Empirically, 
he states that in this regard, human rights instruments promote the minimum 
standard of justice that must be promoted by all States, allowing for 
differences between cultures.  
 
Joshua Cohen provides us with a practical understanding of this issue that I 
will elucidate in chapter five.86  This argument remains premised on the 
notion that it is possible to establish an understanding a common good and it 
is that understanding of the common good that gives a basic understanding 
of justice. I will reiterate at this point however that this pushes towards a 
universalist standard and will disavow cultures where there is disagreement 
even regarding the minimum standard. As we have established, this 
promotes inequality and unfairness, essential cornerstones of any 
instantiation of justice.  
 
However before moving on to testing theory against the practical critiques 
of the current global system, it is imperative to gain a full understanding of 
why the neo-Kantian traditions are now failing to provide a suitable record 
of justice for the current globalised market.  
Cécile Fabre from the London School of Economics advances a critique of 
the Rawlsian tradition that focuses on the principles he elaborates in his 
work ‘The Law of the Peoples’.87 In his writing, Rawls attempts to identify a 
set of principles by which liberal and non-liberal societies can govern their 
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interaction and through which, we are able to class societies as ‘decent’ or 
‘non-decent’ according to these principles.88 Indeed, on page 65 of the ‘Law 
of the Peoples,’ as elaborated upon by Fabre, Rawls sets out in his criteria 
that decent hierarchical societies protect the human rights of its members, 
are governed by a common good idea of justice and incorporate the idea of a 
consultation hierarchy.89  This is qualified further on in his work as 
‘allowing an opportunity for different voices to be heard and which will 
allow the common good idea of justice to be reformed over time, in such a 
way to reflect the needs and interests of society.’90  
In examining Rawls’ criteria, Fabre presents, in my view, a powerful 
critique, which provides us with a highly relevant basis for critiquing a 
modern day application of Rawlsian principles.  
She comments that a requirement of Rawls’ theory is that each member of 
society must belong to a certain group, which, in a politically liberal society 
is defined by the State, however, he does not provide any further elaboration 
on exactly what membership of a particular group means. In practical terms, 
we are confronted regularly by a proliferation of human rights instruments 
to pertain to new groups and thus it begs the question that in absence of a 
coherent definition of what constitutes a group, Rawls theory serves to 
disenfranchise individuals whose membership status is unknown. Fabre 
gives the example of homosexuals and asks whether under a Rawlsian 
understanding, should their personal convictions be given any weight at all 
in a society that does not consider them a group. 91 
Fabre goes on to critique Rawls’ depiction of a common good idea of 
justice, giving rise to similar issues that have already been discussed in this 
paper. Fabre comments that although dissent is permitted in a Rawlsian 
society, he clearly states that dissent is only permitted from the 
government’s interpretation of what constitutes the common good, not the 
actual substantive content of the notion itself. Fabre uses the same example 
as previously mentioned in advancing the hypothesis that in a society where 
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LGBT marriage is seen to run against the values held most fundamental to 
the society, ie. the common good idea of justice, any challenge to that would 
not argue for injustice according to Rawlsian theory, but rather that the view 
deemed to be common in that society is simply unacceptable for that 
particular person. In other words, the fundamental values of each State do 
not necessarily need to reflect each individual in that society. 
In this respect, I will submit, that a Rawlsian understanding of justice 
supports the plight of oppressive regimes whose interpretation of a ‘just’ 
society may not be favourable to its citizens which is not a requirement for a 
‘just’ society according to Rawls.  
Fabre’s critique presents an interesting facet to the Rawlsian tradition of 
universalist values and also, in my opinion, highlights the basis for my 
thoughts on nationalism as a criteria for justice.  
 
Highlighting a similar issue in an empirical context, Satoshi Fukuma 
describes the effect of the Rawlsian tradition on the Japanese society.92 He 
concedes that since a change of government from an ‘English style 
constitutional monarch to a Prussian-style monarchical constitution’,93 there 
has been a tendency for academics in Japan to focus less on Rawls’ work. 
Amongst those who have, Fukuma cites Tanaka Shigeaki and states, 
affirming the previously mentioned assertion, that Rawls’ theory presents an 
ideal theory of justice, however ‘is unsatisfactory when it deals with 
individual injustice such as punishment for crimes, war, conscientious 
objection and civil disobedience.’94 This evidently reinforces the State-
centric universalism on which our global society is based and therefore fails 
to be a truly ‘just’ system. 
Fukuma also cites another Japanese philosopher Iwata Yasuo, whose 
approach to Rawls demonstrates that we must be careful when analysing his 
work. It is an important facet of his thinking that ‘free and equal citizens’, 
‘well ordered societies’ and a ‘fair system of cooperation’ are principles on 
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which Rawls builds his theory and are ultimately, very relevant issues that 
deserve incorporation in any attempt to modernise a theory of justice.95 In 
this respect, it would be foolish and significantly in contradiction to the aim 
of this paper to reductively analyse Rawls stating his theory has no 
relevance because of the promotion of universalism and a State-centric 
ideology. It is indeed Fukuma’s assertion that ‘we must prevent Rawls’ 
research from falling into mere dogmatics.’ This must remain the case, even 
in the face of critiques such as that of William Galston, who states it should 
still not be overlooked that even this set of ‘fundamental ideas’ would be 
‘rejected by many individuals and groups who form important elements of 
that culture.’96 In other words, even asserting the presence of fundamental 
principles that govern any society is ignorant of the pluralistic nature of our 
society.  
Similarly, Kaufman comments that the ‘mere fact of any dissent would 
constitute a decisive objection to Rawls’ argument’.97  
 
What is interesting in Fukuma’s review of Japanese philosophy on Rawls is 
that he also uses Kawamoto to deconstruct flaws existing in the Rawlsian 
tradition. As I have already stated, Rawls’ theory has been criticised as 
succumbing to the political pressures of the 1990s. He states that the 
advocating of an ‘overlapping consensus’ to form a common idea of good 
justice is a fallacy and instead of representing true objectivity, it is a 
succumbing to a liberalism that has been ‘cultivated in the public political 
culture of Western democracies.’98 Interestingly, this critique levelled at 
Rawls suggests that his conceding of some normative authority in 
developing his final theory, to relativist notions has not been done in the 
image of his own description of a just society. It favours Western traditions 
and attempts to transplant and implement them in the guise of an 
‘overlapping consensus’.  
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As a liberalist himself, Fukuma advocates a notion of robust liberalism that 
does not fall foul of a ‘Western’ understanding of justice.99 Such liberalism 
will, he states, truly cultivate the ‘interpretative autonomy of a self-
interpreting being100’ and in contrast to Rawls will recognise the value of 
individual identity rather than associating it with luck, as Rawls’ theory 
does. Fukuma adds that such an approach, means ‘that we should be 
liberated from the ego-centric desire for power and accept others in order to 
make room for the possibility of self-transcendence for freedom.’101 In other 
words, justice can only be achieved once it is accepted that each individual’s 
identity is made of varying facets and only in accepting this are we able to 
establish some form of consensus that, in turn, allows the government to 
promulgate just laws that are fair and equal to all their citizens. This is in 
contrast to Rawls whose overlapping consensus is based on the results of a 
reflective agreement on fundamental principles. 
In ‘Political Liberalism’ Rawls develops a complex and demanding test for 
the reflective equilibrium, requiring that each individual partake in due 
reflection on their convictions in order to come to a decision about the 
fundamental values of a society.102 Interestingly, Rawls couches the due 
reflection requirement in the context of the reasonable person, and the 
judgment must be of a sufficient standing to persuade all reasonable persons 
that it is indeed reasonable.103  In this respect, Rawls incorporates a notion 
of objectivity in his theory. However, as Kaufman comments, ‘these 
arguments must be designed to persuade possessors of relatively unflawed 
critical faculties with broad an unbiased perspectives’.104 In a pluralistic 
society, this would be a near impossible standard.   
Indeed the fact that members of a particular tradition may reject 
fundamental ideas is not an issue for Rawls’ theory because for him, if an 
objective standard is followed, then the fundamental notions will correspond 
to the views of the reasonable person. Rawls criterion for objectivity ‘tests 
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the persuasiveness of the reasons offered in support of the conviction.’ In 
this respect, his theory in ‘Political Liberalism’ follows a two-stage test; the 
first, the original position and the second, the reasonable test to cultivate an 
overlapping consensus. In other words, he maintains that those who reject 
the fundamental ideas are not acting as rational agents and therefore are not 
objective in their personal views. However, Rawls argues that such a 
position will undoubtedly create stability in a society and in this respect, his 
argument is political. A ‘just’ society for Rawls is based on the 
establishment of these principles from the original position behind the veil 
of ignorance to the development of an overlapping consensus from the 
reasonable point of view. The issues that this poses need not be restated at 
this stage.  
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4 The Limitation of Theory 
For Anthony Langlois on Gray, ‘political philosophy bears no relationship 
to the lived experience of people or politics.’105  
It is a common adage in the attempt to make coherent any principles that 
must be applicable and workable to human beings to say that there is a limit 
to theoretical considerations. We take for granted works of those who are 
considered the great thinkers throughout history in attempting to deconstruct 
the nature of the principles that are relevant to individuals in their daily 
lives. However, the pertinence of the justice debate cannot be understated, 
and most importantly, it can be noted throughout the arguments I have 
advanced in this paper so far, that in problematising the work of theorists 
who are regarded as the greatest legal philosophers, the same obstacles 
continue to present themselves. In other words, it is the shared sense of 
awareness that such theories as Rawls’ veil of ignorance, overlapping 
consensus and fundamental ideas are relevant, however, their relevance 
remains in the abstract. In this regard, Anthony Langlois makes a very 
important assertion in his work on politics and justice, when he affirms that 
‘the degree of abstraction is forced to escalate when any attempt to 
understand justice is prescribed.’106 I submit to the accuracy of this opinion. 
Indeed, it seems to be the tendency of legal theorists to apply unworkable 
design models to practical issues in order to explain and provide a concrete 
definition in the face of adversity. This simply does not work. 107 
 
Let us take an example provided by Ronald Dworkin as an illustrative 
demonstration of where theory is self-limiting. I will not focus on 
Dworkin’s understanding of law or of the nature of a just system for the 
reasons already outlined in the first section of this paper. However, the 
aspect of Dworkin’s theory that I submit is useful to establish the limitation 
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of theory is his understanding of the work of a judge.108 I have already 
debated the relevance of the judge as, an organ of the State, as representing 
the ultimate arbiter in correctional justice. Dworkin’s theory sees the judge 
being represented as Herculean. In deliberation of a case before him, for 
Dworkin, all of the reasons for justification of the decision he makes 
regarding the case constitute law.109 In other words, the judge is 
theoretically required to take into account all theoretical values in his 
distribution of a just outcome. Cass Sunstein notes that this is not possible 
and gives two reasons.110 First, he says that it is beyond a judge’s time and 
capacity to do so. Secondly he notes that there are too many factors at play 
involved in the politics of judging for a judge to be able to do so.111  
Sunstein, a staunch critic of the Rawlsian tradition maintains that in the 
same respect, practitioners avoid theorising for the reason that it is time 
consuming, and most interestingly, in his commentary on Rawls states that 
‘citizens are more concerned with seeking agreement on what to do rather 
than exactly how to think.’112 
 
This, I will submit, forms the basis of the limitation to theory. Attempting to 
theorise at an abstract, metaphysical level increases the burden on 
politicians and judges whose work must relate to the realities of an ever-
changing global and pluralistic world.  
Ronald Dworkin stated in his work that principles of fairness and justice 
have a settled though abstract meaning but what, for example, is construed 
as cruel and unusual punishment will vary. 113 Thus emphasising the 
difficulty encountered when trying to theorise the practical.  
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4.1 The Problem with relativising 
It will undoubtedly be understood from a reading of this paperthat my 
submission is based on the idea that assuring a notion of justice should flow, 
not necessarily from the universal, but, in order to be just, take into account 
individual culture and tradition, and that a just law must incorporate 
individual perceptions of morality in order to do so.  
The cultural relativism and universality debate has gained primacy in 
international deliberations, in particular, in response to globalisation and an 
ever-growing push towards the prevalence of an international community.  
It is also through this section that I will begin to introduce relevant human 
rights discourse where this debate is prevalent.  
I have already outlined the link between justice and human rights and my 
view that human rights mechanisms, in achieving equality, are the ultimate 
method towards redressing equality imbalance existing in society. I will 
elaborate on that further in this section.  
 
In the following section, I will continue to outline reasons for which too 
much relativising can in fact undermine any search for a reconceptualisation 
of the notion of justice.  
 
Cultural considerations have long formed a part of international human 
rights discourse. The need for reconciliation of often heavily entrenched 
cultural interests with the universalist requirements of international human 
rights obligations has proved, for States and practitioners alike, an almost 
impossible task to overcome and reaches to the very heart of the concept of 
human rights and their effective application within each State. As already 
established, the fundamental principle of pluralism is that the notion of what 
is ‘good’ can vary and, in this regard, where universalists argue that 
overriding principles can serve to commensurate incommensurable values, 
pluralists or relativists assert that there is be no overriding principle that 
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takes preference.114 As we will go on to establish however, both parties 
maintain the fundamental need for conflict resolution to ensure that equality 
can be guaranteed to the groups targeted by human rights provisions and to 
ensure that justice can flourish.115  
 
On the 5th December 2013, Resolution 21/3 of the United Nations Human 
Rights Council116 came into force. The Resolution, whilst reiterating the 
universal nature of human rights makes a call for a deeper understanding 
and sensitivity to traditional values in the application of international human 
rights standards. The significance of such a declaration must not be 
understated. Indeed, despite previous attempts to incorporate cultural 
considerations into human rights discourse, the Resolution is representative 
of 117 the first and most definitive statement of the United Nations to date 
that seemingly contradicts Roosevelt’s ‘indivisible, inalienable, universal’ 
adage that launched human rights into the international arena in 1948.118 It 
is a push at the global level, to promote an understanding the most equality 
can only be understood from a subjective approach.   
 
Most pertinently, the relevance of the cultural relativism debate concerning 
the United Nations Human Rights Council is as regards the case of so-called 
vulnerable groups, whose social, political and legal position is not only 
highly dependent on the volition of the State119 in which they reside but 
seemingly through such a Resolution, whose procedural and substantive 
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marginalisation may effectively be legitimised by the statements of an 
international body.120  
 
In such cases, Western media accord no justification to relativist principles 
that might limit the application of international human rights norms, 
provides a biased starting point to which many commentators limit 
themselves.121  
 
A pertinent example is the discussion surrounding the rights of the LGBT 
community. Carlos Ball in his article argues the State may set policies based 
in part on moral judgments related to sexual orientation under three 
conditions. He says that moral considerations at issue must have empirical 
support and those considerations must be consistent with the nation's 
constitutional values. 122123 These final considerations are represented in 
Rawlsian theory; the understanding of the fundamental values held at State-
level.  
This however, does not alter the fact that the State, in practice must 
promulgate laws reductively in accordance with one ideology. This has 
caused issues in the Russian state where there have been claims that Russia 
is using this practical limitation in order to assert some kind of moral 
sovereignty over its citizens. However, such issues of nationalism will be 
discussed in the following section.  
 
The difficulty of ensuring fairness through promulgating laws and policies 
that are not reductive and ensure fair representation for individual identity is 
that this a vast and complex task that undoubtedly would, to use the words 
of Ronald Dworkin, require a Herculean law maker in order to choose.124 
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Indeed, as an additional facet, Alexander Kaufman asks the question 
whether ‘deliberators located within a tradition can plausibly be expected to 
reassess the tradition itself. Aren’t politically liberal deliberators in fact 
required to relativize their judgments to the culture in which they are 
located?’125  Kaufman negates this question in terms of Rawlsian theory, 
saying that there must be common values in order to generate the substance 
of a theory of justice.   
The true liberal tradition however means that any common values must be a 
product of a ground of political deliberation; a political conception of justice 
cannot justify the use of the coercive force of law without rendering true the 
idea that the views of each member of society deserve equal respect. 126 This 
is where relativism is indeed necessary; a person’s entire identity deserves 
respect in order for the laws that apply to them to be considered just. 
 
There remains the possibility however that relativism can go to far. I submit 
that over-relativisation will lead to too much defragmentation of the values 
that are imperative to adhere to the State-centric conception of the law. If 
each value is attempted to be taken into account then, evidently, this will 
lead to a lack of stability, with different standards being applied to different 
individuals in the administration of justice, leading to ultimately, an unjust 
result. 
 
In the context of respect for the Islamic tradition, Abdullahi An-Na’im 
argues that to be culturally sensitive to the norms applicable in Shari’a law 
must not engender an extreme form of cultural relativism where different 
standards are applied depending on the normative system to which the 
individual adheres.127 
 
The prevailing view regarding the universalism and cultural relativism 
debate is that governments in creating a just system should take into account 
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when promulgating their laws, each individual tradition of each individual 
culture existing within the State.  
However, the underlying assumption that is made when suggesting as such, 
is that because we can regard each way of life as a valid way of living, the 
argument effectively is that ‘we should be able to live by any of the 
traditions ‘on offer.’ Indeed, the concept of relativism is premised upon the 
assumption that there is no objective way of judging the values of each 
individual in society.128 Radical relativists, following a Communitarian 
critique, will assert that there can be no objective standard because 
subjective views are incommensurable. However, in his work on 
incompletely theorised agreements, Cass Sunstein puts a brake on concept 
of radical relativism.129  
He advances the idea that in order to promote and promulgate laws that are 
‘just’, the process should not be based on the arbitrary and ultimately lazy 
assumption that there is no way to commensurate values. He says that in 
order to provide a workable notion of justice, we should work within the 
framework of justice as discursive and not arbitrary.130 To arbitrarily assign 
equal value to all individual values would engender similar issues to those 
already stated in this section; an over-fragmentation of standards that should 
be applied. Sunstein maintains that justice is not about unbridled relativism 
and is certainly not about promoting values in acute cases. He advances the 
idea of good faith incomplete theorisation of justice and this is a concept 
that forms the basis of my criteria for a workable notion of justice, which I 
will elucidate at a later stage in the paper.  
 
I submit equally, following Langlois’ understanding, that if we begin to 
accord value arbitrarily, this would lead to an effective undermining of the 
concept of justice as a whole. Although I will deal with acute cases of 
ideology in the next section, it is important to note, that to continue with 
unbridled relativism would ordinarily allow us to say that regimes such as 
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that of the Nazis could be regarded as just, if that represents the 
fundamentalist view of the population of the time. 
 
4.2 The Importance of relativising 
Ultimately however, we must remain aware that even in the face of so-
called unbridled relativism, it is imperative not to disenfranchise groups in 
our society whose values are fundamental to their way of life.  
 
The basic premise behind the human rights regime is to provide individuals 
with a tool for leading lives according to the values they prioritise. It is not 
about establishing an overlapping consensus of values but rather recognising 
the value in individual versions of morality. It is about equality, fairness and 
toleration.  
 
The project is about recognising the individuality of our citizens and 
ensuring that those that have a duty towards each individual promote their 
individuality. It is for this reason that human rights as a mechanism for 
providing justice are so pertinent. Jack Donnelly phrases this as human 
rights providing the basis of a claim against the duty holder.131 Not only 
therefore do human rights control the assignation of justice to individuals 
but they provide individuals with a control mechanism against the State 
who, in the current international system, holds the duty to promote justice.   
 
Commentators have focused on the importance of human rights to a ‘just’ 
society in a vast collection of academic commentary.132 Ulf Petersmann 
states that, and I see it as necessary to quote in full,  ‘…inalienable human 
rights have become part of national and international constitutional law; as 
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such, they must be the guiding principle for theories of justice aimed at 
empowerment of individuals through protection of equal basic rights, non-
discriminatory competition, satisfaction of basic individual needs, and the 
democratic self-government that is necessary for personal self-development 
in dignity.’133 Human rights, in this respect are about distributive justice; 
they guide government where groups are marginalised by the societies in 
which they live. 
 
The universalist nature of these values will be discussed in the next section, 
however, it should be understood that I take a fundamental and most broad 
view that human rights are to ensure respect for each individual. The regime 
in which this is implemented pertains to a universalism with which I am 
uncomfortable, however, this will be assessed in the next section.  
 
The various regional adjudicative bodies for human rights have also 
reiterated the key importance of individual values in structuring a concept of 
justice. In the seminal case from the European Court of Human Rights of 
Loizidou v Turkey,134 the Grand Chamber stated that it is the task of the 
Court to ensure that individual rights are respected to the highest degree, 
taking away the emphasis on the values enshrined in objectivity.  
 
‘The dynamic evolution of regional and global integration law illustrates 
that justice remains a never-ending regulatory task and cannot related to one 
value, be it equality or any other, but only to the complex value system of a 
man, a community, or mankind.’135 
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5 The current framework: 
Human rights, Territorialism, 
Power and a Failure of 
Justice  
Peg Birmingham sums up effectively the problematic of the current State-
centric system. ’The problem of reducing human rights to a political 
principle of liberalism is that this again equates rights with the status of the 
citizen.’136 In this respect, the liberal State, for its citizens, represents the 
most favourable view of what is just. This, arguably, is a statement against 
the most concrete original understanding of human rights.137 
 
The adage levelled at the current framework of international human rights is 
that it favours the West. It is the product of Western ideals that fail to take 
into account the complexities and specifics of a non-Western notion of 
human rights. The underlying assumption made in such a critique 
contextualises the foundations of the justice problem. The human rights 
regime has been criticised as reductively collating principles and agreements 
on the substantive values that are important to each individual into one 
ideology that is reminiscent of a Western perception of human rights.138 It 
fails to represent the notion that these principles may not be valuable to all 
cultures and all traditions. 
 
It is my understanding of such an argument that a further facet to the 
problematisation of justice is the character of the international legal context 
in which human rights norms have developed. The problem in this case, 
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representing the quote at the opening of this section, is the fact that the 
distribution of human rights is through a State-centric system.139  
International Law, taking its origins more or less from the Peace of 
Westphalia prescribes the requirements for Statehood prima facie, in the 
Montevideo Convention on Statehood in 1933.140 Although the 
requirements have been significantly debated and extended since 1933, for 
the purposes of this paper, the prescription of Statehood following the 
requirements of the Montevideo Convention, in my opinion, has led to a 
decline in the ability of individuals to have their personal identities and 
values fully recognised.  
 
The concept of State sovereignty contained in the UN Charter affirms this 
view.141 It is for individual governments to implement the human rights 
norms that they presume to be relevant to the citizens on their territory. The 
current international order is based on an attempt to implement a 
universalism at State level. What this effectively means is that, each 
individual government is placed in a position where they are required to 
promulgate laws that represent their ideology. Even a democratically elected 
government operating in a liberalist tradition would be unable to implement 
more than one ideology. Of course, it is understood that a requirement of an 
efficient government is stability and as already stated, a lack of stability 
would be caused by an over-fragmentation of the ideologies it promulgates, 
thus leading to an instable and ultimately unjust system.  
 
Although the human rights project has been supported as redressing the 
balance, the concept of the nation State and the distributive nature of the 
human rights project under international law mean that States are sovereign 
to implement their own ideologies and promulgate the rights that are felt to 
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represent their citizens. Thus representation of individual morality is 
blocked by the State and the effective representation thereof is rendered an 
even harder task. 
 
This is perhaps best understood from a religious perspective. To take a 
salient example, as a minority religious order in a liberalist system, the 
United Kingdom provides an example of a liberal democracy that has made 
attempts to validate Shari’a norms in certain circumstances. Under section 1 
of the United Kingdom Arbitration Act 1996142, parties are free to choose 
the method of arbitration in order to resolve their dispute. As a result, 
Shari’a councils are accorded normativity and may operate subject to 
requirements relating to public morality.143 Indeed, contemporary Islamic 
scholars claim that a modern interpretation of Islam does not support cruel 
or degrading punishments,144 and as a result, the Shari’a councils do not 
operate such a policy. Although arbitration by such councils is permitted 
under the Arbitration Act, the UK executive has been very clear in stating 
that their judgments carry no legal validity.145 According to journalist 
Joachim Wagner, using Islamic values in Islamic arbitration is a threat to 
constitutional values because they are side lined in favour of a Shari’a-based 
interpretation.146 The UK is undoubtedly aware of this and permits, but does 
not fully incorporate or apply Shari’a norms. 
It is however imperative to understand that ‘Muslim law is still superior and 
dominant over English law in the Muslim mind and in the eyes of the 
Muslim community’.147 In this regard, Muslims, as we will see, do not 
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separate the legal from the religious148 and as such a compromise must be 
sought in order for pluralism to flourish within the liberal community.149  
 
The problem, very clearly demonstrated by the operation of Islamic norms 
in liberal democracies is that States must promulgate one idea of justice. In 
doing so however, it very clearly disenfranchises large sections of the 
population.  
Rationality is however an important principle and we cannot ignore the 
argument that fundamentally, all humans are the same and in that respect, 
that is argued to stand over religion as a measuring stick for justice.150  
 
In order to remain faithful to a theoretical foundation that may serve to 
facilitate the process of creating a workable understanding of justice 
notions, it would be useful to problematize the current system of 
international law with reference to the work of Hannah Arendt. Her view on 
justice and human rights differed substantially from the politically 
motivated liberal understandings of justice illustrated by legal philosophers 
more heavily influenced by the Kantian tradition. Indeed, the key aspect of 
Arendtian justice is that she believed in an ontological foundation for human 
rights rather than a teleological foundation. In other words, Arendt’s belief 
was that human rights are with us since birth; that the basis for human rights 
is the event of natality itself.151 In such a statement, Peg Birmingham argues 
that Arendt criticizes the Kantian tradition, stating that philosophers with 
this mind were naïve in their understanding of humanity.152  
Arendt’s viewpoint was that we hold a right to have rights due to our nature 
of humans and that the rights of every individual should be guaranteed by 
humanity itself.153 John Rawls’ response however remains faithful to the 
current model of international law. For Rawls, the idea of a ‘free citizen is 
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still determined by a liberal political conception and not by any 
comprehensive doctrine which extends beyond the category of the 
political.’154 
 
I have made it clear in previous sections of this paper that theory has its 
limitations and thus I am not proposing that the Arendtian method of 
conceptualizing human rights should provide a basis for a practical and 
workable definition of for justice. However, Arendt’s critique is useful in 
order to demonstrate the shortcomings of the State-centric system in 
implementing a common ideology. For that reason, the discussion of 
Arendtian based theory is brief. 
 
Thus, in the face of a system where the State is the ultimate arbiter of justice 
and can implement the perception of justice it chooses, the argument 
advanced by Joshua Cohen seems to be the most appropriate.155 He states 
that in the face of huge disagreement, we are forced to work with a 
minimalist conception of justice and human rights in order to seek to 
encourage the maximum participation of States. In other words, if human 
rights instruments conform to the idea of negative liberty in the sense that 
they set the minimum standard thus leaving a wide margin of appreciation 
to States, this has been seen as a solution to the issue of the international 
State-centric model. It will encourage States to promulgate a theory of 
justice based on the most central values that the international community 
endorses. 
However, an understanding that there is deep disagreement on a lack of a 
minimum standards for Joshua Cohen, promotes a minimalism conception 
of justice that is merely procedural.156 This requires however, at least a base 
of agreement on what the minimum standard is. In his article, Cohen 
differentiates the concepts of what he terms substantive minimalism and 
justificatory minimalism. The idea I have just discussed is an example of the 
former. Justificatory minimalism advances the same idea that human rights 
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need to be minimalist in their obligations in order to increase participation 
however it goes further than substantive minimalism in Cohen’s 
understanding that there can be agreement about the minimal rights, ‘as long 
as no one asks why’ incorporating the idea that the basis for human rights is 
on the idea that there should be some idea of pragmatism, with a ‘single 
body of beliefs for guidance on action’.157 
Overall, the crux of Cohen’s statement rests on his assertion that ‘if we are 
looking to assure a conception of human rights is actually accepted from 
within a wide range of traditions – not simply that it be acceptable – then the 
content is likely to be driven down to a minimum.’158 
 
 
These considerations are interesting in the context of liberal governments 
whose perceived intention is to provide the fairest and most just 
environment in which their citizens are able to live.  
However, my criticism of the current international model takes a rather 
more sinister turn, in recognition of the fact that the concept of sovereignty 
is at the very least, efficient, that is until there is abuse. I have already began 
to highlight the relevance in Cass Sunstein’s work, whose premise for 
creating a workable definition of justice lies in the idea that it would be lazy 
to assign value to acute cases where there is a tendency towards 
extremism.159 As already stated, he relies on the idea that justice should be 
discursive, not arbitrary.160 
 
This problem is also postulated in Rawlsian theory when he states that rights 
belong to those lucky enough to have landed historically in a liberal 
constitutional state. Those states that deny human rights are condemned on 
the basis of the validity of the liberal state, whose validity in turn, is 
assumed on the basis of its mere existence.161 
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Fig. 3 – When justice values become arbitrary  
 
To problematise, because the model of international law to which we 
subscribe globally favours the State as the arbiter of justice for its citizens, 
and therefore ideology must be reduced to State ideology, the ‘acute’ cases 
of arbitrariness as elucidated by Sunstein, actually become a control 
mechanism for governments to promote a particularistic view of justice, in 
the advancement of ideology that suits, not the values of the citizens found 
on a territory but the values of the authorities in control of a country.162 
Cohen describes this as the idea that ‘basic human rights flow from the 
responsibility of officials to care for the common good’,163 as an 
observational criticism of the human rights regime to which we currently 
subscribe.  
 
In this sense, culture and cultural values no longer are inherently related to 
promotion of justice to a culture, but instead are a mechanism for power. If 
we are to use the model of a paternalistic government, as Langlois argues, 
we must advocate the strongest instantiation of that model in order to 
provide the right environment to ensure law and order. Langlois states that 
the broadness of the definition of what constitutes cultural values means that 
it can be used ‘to the advantage of those who would use it to further a 
particular socio-political agenda…Culture may be subsumed by the State, 
with the concept of ‘national identity’ being used to regulate cultural 
difference.’164 He further expresses that it is the State elites who claim the 
authority to interpret cultural frameworks. This undeniably is due to the 
concept of Statehood existing in the international legal order.  
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Although it is argued by Langlois that a strong paternalistic government is 
needed to provide the environment to ensure law and order,165 such 
authority can lead to abuse. 
To express the idea of culture as power, and the problems raised by adhering 
to a model of Sovereignty based statehood, I have chosen to use the Russian 
example.  
 
In recent times, the most successful attempt by a State in gaining hegemony 
(at the HRC) for a limitation of human rights norms through the advocating 
of traditional values has been the coming into force of Federal Law Number 
135-FZ of the Russian Federation166. On June 29, 2013, Russian President 
Vladimir Putin signed into law norms prohibiting “propaganda of non-­‐
traditional sexual relations,” including statements about gay, lesbian, 
bisexual, and transgender relationships, aimed at or in the presence of 
minors. Despite consistent marginalization of the LGBT community prior to 
2013, the hardening of the principle into law received significant 
condemnation from International Organisations and other States, whose 
criticisms centre around a violation of Russian obligations under ratified 
international human rights conventions. 
Perhaps most importantly however for our argument, domestically, the Law 
received prima facie eighty-eight percent public support.167 
Under a Rawlsian viewpoint, this is key because it would mean, under his 
theory that is nothing to do with justice, for it promotes the fundamental 
agreement of a common idea of justice within a State. It can simply be 
unacceptable for the individuals concerned.  
 
A global human rights regime could, redress this issue by providing a tool 
for making fair the imbalances; however, this is rendered impossible by the 
State centric model of international law.  
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A criticism levelled by Cai Wilkinson at the Law and its justification 
through the traditional values discourse centres around the way in which 
Russia’s supposed claim that the traditional values it seeks to protect do not 
arise from cultural differences already existing in Russia.168 Wilkinson 
states that in consideration of persistent homophobia in Russia emanating 
largely from the State, the traditional values discourse has been used simply 
as a convenient proxy for homophobic values. These homophobic values, 
translated as traditional values, are then used by the Kremlin to supposedly 
align itself with its obligations under international human rights law by 
providing a prima facie legitimate derogation therefrom. Wilkinson terms 
this moral sovereignty.169 
 
In other words, Putin has sought to impose the traditional values not from a 
bottom-up approach, as defined by Russian society, but rather as a top-down 
approach, defined by the State. This, of course, if we refer back to the 
definition of relativism simply does not fit with cultural relativism but 
would instead constitute a flagrant disregard for the obligations Russia holds 
under International Human Rights law.170 
 
This critique is not new. Indeed, Gulnaz Sharafutdinova terms the moral 
sovereignty argument as the Kremlin’s ‘moral campaign.’171 She uses it to 
establish that the Kremlin’s close influence with the Russian Orthodox 
Church means that their policies and legislation are closely reflective of a 
Christian morality. She states that in the face of elections, ‘the opposition 
placed the issues of honesty, civic duty, decency and ethics on the table to 
which the Kremlin reacted with a more traditionalist message of patriotism, 
traditional values and morals, appealing to the more conservative electorate, 
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re-appropriating and re-calibrating the opposition rhetoric into one that 
would fit the Kremlin’s agenda.’172  
In other words, the legislation promulgated by the Kremlin is not 
necessarily, to fit in with the Resolution’s traditional values requirement, 
representative of Russian society, but rather of the Kremlin’s desire to 
impose its own moral values on the people of Russia.  
 
Indeed, a closer reading of such critiques leads us to the conclusion that the 
positivist conception of the law as a closed normative arena of social norms 
emanating from the people and promulgated by the State is potentially 
merely a cloak for enacting the Kremlin’s own moral campaign. If this were 
the case, we are not faced with a case of cultural relativism vs universalism 
debate.173  
Instead, in the presence of a moral campaign, culture is used as power, and a 
destruction of even the overlapping consensus on values promulgated by 
Rawls. 
 
The example of the recently passed Russian legislation serves to 
demonstrate that under the international legal model, the ideology of the 
government is subject to arbitrary hierarchical value judgments on the 
nature and quality of what is perceived just or representative of the values 
that a State’s citizens hold. 
 
The issue is further exacerbated in particularly acute cases where the 
government’s ideology promotes extremist values, incompatible with any 
fundamental notion of what is just. It is inevitable to say that although there 
is no agreement necessarily regarding what exactly constitutes a 
fundamental value, it would be a complete misunderstanding of the notion 
of justice, if it were accepted that simply because a government promulgates 
their ideology, it must be assigned value. This is particularly relevant in 
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cases of oppressive regimes where the values pertinent to citizens of a State 
are not taken into account. 
 
An understanding in this respect is particularly well demonstrated by the 
case of the Cambodian genocide. In dictator Pol Pot’s own words, he 
asserted that the corpus of norms relating to human rights has ‘no relevance’ 
to the Cambodian population.174 Evidently, this demonstrates vast failings of 
the international State-centric system to provide any sense of justice to the 
population through the promulgation of laws. 
 
Equally, another aspect to the State-based model for the provision of justice 
is that in order to redress the balance where citizen’s rights have been 
violated, there should be accountability and the possibility for citizens to see 
that ‘justice has been done’. This plays to a wider understanding of the 
concept in the sense that it is expected that the Courts as state should play a 
role in addressing any imbalances of justice. It advocates a view of 
correctional justice.  
The problem is that when the Courts are State organs and thus are subject to 
the same ideology that is dominant within a particular State, accountability 
can also be subject to abuse. Indeed, in States who reject the Westminster 
model of governance, and thus have not incorporated a separation of powers 
and thus have no independence of the judiciary the opportunity to redress 
any imbalance in justice is eliminated. The rule of law for example is 
normally in place to limit arbitrary decision making by judges. However, 
this is rendered impossible in these normative environments. 
 
To respect the State-based system of sovereignty, the discourse surrounding 
immunity of heads of state leading to impunity is heavily littered with 
methods175 for circumventing the system to ensure that those who violate 
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principles of justice are held accountable in order to provide some access to 
justice and disallow those governments that use the State based system to 
promulgate ideologies undermining the very notion of justice from doing so 
free from restraint.  
 
For Petersmann, the universal recognition of human rights requires a 
citizen-oriented ‘constitutionalization’ of the traditional state centered 
international legal system….Yet it seems obvious that the current 
international economic and legal order is not sufficiently ‘just’ to be 
durable.176 Indeed, the Arendtian tradition although already elaborated upon, 
clarifies the issue by stating that the reason for which we must take 
responsibility as an international community for violations committed by 
State actors is to face up to the human capacity to commit evil acts, and it is 
therefore the responsibility of all humanity to address those issues.177  
 
Reductively justice is not a case of good vs evil.178 This is a far too 
simplistic understanding of the concept. However, it is a criticism of the 
State system to allow any State to promulgate an ideology that undermines 
any concept of equality and fairness, as promulgated by the human rights 
project.  
 
5.1 Accountability: Attempts to address 
the justice balance 
I have already outlined my understanding that due to the State-centric model 
of the international system, State authorities are forced into defining a 
notion of objectivity, in order to provide a stable, equal and fair framework 
to their citizens.  
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It is my argument however, that in the face of globalisation and a lack of 
recourse in situations where the above is not the aim of State authorities, the 
international community has effectively ‘stepped-up’ the level of objectivity 
in the global hierarchy. In other words, the level of objectivity is now 
associated not only with State based view on justice, but equally, in the face 
of failure, a global objective standard applies.  
 
The issues and dynamics of the human rights project in attempting to 
promulgate global values have already been discussed in this paper and will 
not be discussed further. Academic discourse surrounding the human rights 
project and its attempts to universalise an understanding of human rights is 
vast.179 
The issue however, is that following a politically liberalist standpoint, the 
human rights regime is premised on the notion that there exists a common 
notion of the good that can be applied to all parties. The problems 
associated with such a premise have already been discussed.  
In this respect, the human rights project is not the only framework that has 
been advanced in the international arena for correcting the imbalance of 
justice caused by objective standards at the State level. Whether an attempt 
to redress the balance by providing a global understanding of justice is 
effective is something that remains to be seen. However, I will in the 
coming sections, briefly outline and discuss the international methods for 
using global objectivity to redress the justice balance where States are 
unable or unwilling to do so themselves.  
 
Marginalising the understanding that the human rights regime seeks to 
promulgate one notion of justice, it should be not insinuated at any point 
however that the human rights project is completely unsuccessful in its 
aims. Indeed, its aim is to create a framework that allows human rights to be 
operable in achieving justice. It is argued that the world is better off with 
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such a framework than without such a framework. Several reasons are 
proposed for such an assertion.  
 
Emilie Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui maintain that the current 
framework of human rights is not sufficient to be successful in its aims, 
however, they provide hegemony for the notion of a human rights 
framework itself. They state that inter alia, the human rights regime initiates 
processes and dialogues and provides rules and structure to constrain 
national sovereignty, however maintain that such a structure will take time 
to become important to a State.180  
I submit, that the State sponsored ideology, only in very few cases, results in 
a complete rejection of State ideology, thus leading to a breakdown of 
society as a whole. However, in the cases that do not reach such cases of 
severity, we cannot ignore that often a government’s ideology is tightly 
linked to the legal culture existing within a State and thus a level of 
objective justice transcending that of the State will struggle to engender 
change. Indeed, in very acute cases Hafner-Burton maintain that 
‘implementing human rights laws requires not only the political will at 
home, but also the political capacity.’181 
If the human rights project is at its very heart aimed at redressing the 
balance of equality and justice in a State, paradoxically, the system is failing 
where there is the most imbalance of justice.  
 
Both Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui maintain that norms of justice rarely 
become institutionalised through International Law. However, some success 
may be gained through what they propose to be a process of acculturation. 
Acculturation is the process by which in the face of uncertainty, States will 
mimic the actions of other States. Thus, in practice, if the human rights 
regime provides the framework for acculturation where States whose 
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territorial neighbours hold better records for adhering to human rights 
norms, will in some respect begin to mimic the political processes. 
I however maintain that this is over simplified and must agree with Hafner-
Burton and Tsutsui when they state that ‘socialisation and learning require 
repeated access to target repressors and many of these actors are likely to be 
marginalised from participation in human rights institutions, remaining 
isolated from active process of norm inculcation.’182 The case of the 
marginalisation of LGBT rights in Russia serves to demonstrate that this 
point may even be extended to those States who participate highly in 
international human rights process, in the ever-perpetuating battle between 
universalism and cultural relativity.  
 
The only usage that the two previously mentioned authors see for an 
international human rights regime is to prevent slippage into worse 
violations.183 I submit that this alone demonstrates the need for a major re 
haul of the human rights regime in the provision of justice. 
 
5.2 National, regional and global 
adjudication of justice 
 
As already addressed, the human rights project attempts to a priori redress 
the justice balance by providing minimum standards that transcend the 
theoretical boundaries of the nation State by holding their applicability to 
every individual. The two main issues with the project however, as I submit 
is that States who are unwilling to adopt the human rights project are under 
no obligation to do so, thus achieving no effect. And in those States who do 
adopt the norms of an international objective standard for justice, this can 
still raise concerns of abuse.  
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This is the major failing when the Rawlsian politically liberal account of 
justice is tested.  
 
Equally, the human rights regime is an attempt at a priori addressing of 
imbalance in the provision of just laws for a State’s citizen. In other words, 
it addresses a future imbalance in the justice system before violations and 
marginalisation of group and individual values occur, by providing a 
framework to ensure that this does not occur.  This however represents only 
one manner in which the international community has attempted to provide 
a higher level of objectivity.  
 
Secondly, cognitive of the fact that, for the reasons detailed in the previous 
section, the limits of State sovereignty effectively mean that States may 
choose to reject or accept international justice-promoting norms into their 
ideologies, internationally, the system also provides for a post facto 
addressing of the justice imbalance. Although subject to the same concerns 
regarding State sovereignty, international and regional adjudication of 
justice has made tracks into breaking down the sphere of impunity 
associated with rogue States whose will is not to put into effect the values of 
their citizens, but rather to systematically destroy the quality of lives of their 
citizens.  
 
I remain aware that the discussion of international adjudication raises the 
question of transcendence of different corpuses of norms that require 
different standards and different practices. Indeed, adjudication of violations 
of justice is a matter for the body of norms known as International Criminal 
law, whereas those affecting human rights are referred to as International 
Human Rights law. However, I reject the lex specialis maxim184 of 
fragmentation of the international legal system, thus preferring to regard 
every international norm in the same normative sphere. It is beyond this 
paper to discuss the controversies concerned with putting norms yielding 
conflicting results in the same sphere, as this is not the focus.  
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Norms of International law that relate to the adjudication of justice are, in 
theory, in place to provide a form of correctional justice to ensure that 
marginalised groups whose values are not accounted for, or are indeed, 
systematically destroyed, retain representation and have access to 
accountability against the authorities implementing acute ideologies of 
justice specifically to their detriment.  
 
Overall, the International Criminal Court185 and the various regional Human 
Rights Courts186 aim to overcome the issues relating to objectivity at the 
State level, and instead purport to oversee the correct administration of 
justice in its broadest sense at both international and regional levels. Of 
course, this does not mean that there has been a rejection of the 
fundamentalism of State sovereignty, but rather an attempt to promote 
justice in systems where States are unfairly doing so. 
 
To demonstrate such intervention, Article 13 of the Rome Statute187 
provides for the investigation into a case by the United Nations Security 
Council, even when States have not become Ratifying Parties of the Statute 
and reject the notion of the International Court. 
Often, reasons cited for the rejection of the adjudication of the international 
and regional courts is that they promote a Western-based ideology, the 
concern of which has already been addressed. In this regard, the 
adjudication of the ICC has been cited as been representative of Western 
control and as a court for African leaders.188 Courtenay Griffiths QC 
maintains that violations committed by Western leaders will ever be 
adjudicated before the Court.189 The reasons for which are not in the scope 
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of this paper, but instead I attempt to provide an overview of the reasons for 
which an international justice ideology is not always sufficient.  
 
As I have previously stated, my view of the term justice is in its broadest 
sense; ensuring equality, conditions for autonomous living, and the taking 
into account of all traditions and ways of life that do not fulfil the conditions 
necessary to activate the Millian harm principle.190  
For this reason, I permit myself the opportunity to discuss the Courts for the 
promotion of human rights in the same section as discussion concerning the 
criminal justice system. The criminal justice system is, as I see it, a way of 
redressing the balance in more acute cases where violations require penal 
action, rather than economic or other sanctions. 
Similar criticisms have been levelled at these Courts, even by liberalist 
democracies that seek to implement a notion of justice in accordance with 
international guidelines. A notable example is the ruling of the European 
Court of Human Rights that prisoners should be permitted the opportunity to 
vote.191 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom made a statement to say 
that such a ruling is incompatible with the legal culture of the United 
Kingdom and thus the United Kingdom will not be following the judgment. 
Despite sanctions imposed, the rule remains as such.192 
 
Finally, returning to the justice norms adjudicated by criminal bodies. In 
serious cases, penal action is required. However, at the highest level of 
global objectivity, this is not only been permitted as justiciable for the ICC, 
but these are seen as violations that should be subject to universal 
jurisdiction. I return once again in favour of the Arendtian view that ‘in one 
form or another, men must assume responsibility for all crimes committed 
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by human beings and that all nation share the onus of evil committed by 
all.’193 
 
This view represents a primitive understanding of the concept of universal 
jurisdiction which is an extraterritorial extension of State’s jurisdictional 
claim over a case that has no connecting factor the State itself. Under 
normal circumstances, jurisdiction can only be claimed under international 
law if there is a connecting factor to the State claiming jurisdiction; active 
personality, passive personality or territoriality. In other words, a State must 
normally have a legitimate interest in prosecuting the violation. For the 
purposes of our discussion, I am interested in the potential justice value of a 
claim by a State that has no direct relationship to the State or individual in 
which the violation has been committed.  
There are even efforts to see universal jurisdiction for the worst violations 
incorporated into the body of customary international law, thus obliging all 
States to conform regardless of their volition. 
In essence, universal jurisdiction represents the ultimate attempt at 
redressing the balance. It allows any State to prosecute an individual for 
crimes committed in another State where that State fails or is unwilling to 
address the concept of justice. If another State deems that its ideology is 
sufficient to align itself with international justice norms that permit 
universal jurisdiction, then it is able within that ideology to prosecute the 
individual in that State. It is applying one State’s objective moral criteria to 
a national of another State.  
Currently, universal jurisdiction is called for, for what have been deemed by 
the international community as the most serious disregards for justice. A 
controversial departure from the State-centric model of international law, 
universal jurisdiction provides a corrective control mechanism to address 
the imbalance.  
 
The strongest case for universal jurisdiction in the provision of justice for 
instances of slavery is not difficult. It is, both under customary international 
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law condemned as an international crime and has been subject for over 200 
years to jurisdiction by any state.   
Bassiouni, states the reasons for which, in his article on Enslavement as an 
International Crime.194 He looks historically at the Declaration of the 
Congress of Vienna in 1814 where the crime of slavery was related to 
piracy. Since then, he states, there have been 47 Conventions from 1874 to 
1996 which have related to slavery, He makes it clearer that the case for 
universal jurisdiction is simpler in the case of slavery related to piracy 
because evidently, the need for universal prosecution of pirates on the High 
Seas is clear and defined. In that respect, the same should arguably apply to 
the case of slavery.  195 
Bassiouni then looks further at the case of slavery in terms of the sexual 
exploitation of persons. He states that in this case, a case for universal 
jurisdiction can also be easily made out because the exploitation usually 
takes place on the territory of one state and in the case of trafficking, many 
states. In this regard, the jurisdictional regime that should apply should 
allow all states to prosecute due to the nature of the crime.    
Finally, Bassioni looks at sexual exploitation in the context of war crimes. 
In this context, and as we have previously established, the legal regime 
applying to war crimes should also apply to cases of slavery. In other words, 
in all relevant treaties, there is a requirement for all signatory States to take 
effective measures to prevent and suppress slavery.    
Bassiouni’ states that although a number of societies have considered 
slavery morally repugnant, it has evolved from a moral offense to an 
international crime. He states that currently there are 79 instruments relating 
to slavery internationally.196     
Equally, he looks at the intention of the drafters of each of these instruments 
and states that the aim, in the early stages was to create universal 
jurisdiction for slavery.    
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Although it may be possible to state that States have sufficient legislative 
basis to prosecute using stronger bases of jurisdiction, the issue remains 
however that slavery, in the modern world is manifesting itself in such a 
way that it is difficult, and indeed would be erroneous to attempt to apply 
the existing legislative framework to an expanding range of contemporary 
slavery practice.    
Bassiouni uses the case of child trafficking as a seminal example of where 
there is an effective legislative gap between the jurisdictional regime 
contained in the legal instruments relating to slavery and the practice in 
states. He states that States are able to circumvent international instruments 
by stating that their practice is for the benefit of the children. Indeed, what 
this means in practice is that there is a lack of legislation and legal 
mechanisms in the countries where slavery is extremely prominent. The 
issue, for Bassiouni regards the threshold for the relevant slavery legislation. 
He makes it clear that the requirement of the international instruments 
relating to slavery is that of ‘total and physical control by one person over 
another.197’ The issue is that these kinds of requirements present an 
extremely high and unattainable threshold for contemporary cases of slavery 
where there may not be total control present. In this case, in order for States 
to be deterred from and effectively unable to circumvent these controls is to 
subject the crime of slavery to universal jurisdiction. In this respect, even in 
contemporary practice of slavery, a State that condemns in its entirety any 
form of slavery would be capable of prosecuting the perpetrators of what 
has long been considered a crime of international nature and in this respect, 
produce an objectively just result.  
However, the process of creating universal jurisdiction has been based on 
consensus. For slavery, the level of consensus has been extremely high and 
the number of international instruments would point to legitimising 
objectively global morality.  
This perhaps is illustrative of a reality where agreement on fundamental 
rights is acceptable and can be subject to international oversight.  
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Sonja Boelart-Suominnen summarises succinctly the legal basis for a claim 
of universal jurisdiction.198 It is imperative to note at this stage that the legal 
basis for jurisdiction is, as stated by Boelart, is no need for a link such as the 
nationality of the perpetrator nor for any other connecting factor between 
the suspect and the country in which the suspect is tried. This is 
demonstrative of the called for mandatory universal jurisdiction for those 
who commit grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.199 It is equally 
important to note at this stage that asserting jurisdiction on no other grounds 
other than the principle of universality will undoubtedly impinge on the 
sovereignty of the State that would, under normal circumstances claim a 
more direct basis of jurisdiction. Thus, it is an accepted principle that states 
should normally consent to universal jurisdiction or for universal 
jurisdiction to take its basis in legislation, which has become, through State 
practice and opinio juris, accepted as a principle of customary international 
law. As regards the Geneva Conventions, State practice demonstrates that 
they are part of customary international law. Thus, the need for consent is, 
under the current model vitiated by consistent state practice and opinio 
juris.    
In other words, agreement has been so high, that a global level of objectivity 
on the moral criteria for being just in these circumstances is classed as 
agreed upon. 
 
In order to address issues with State sovereignty, I will discuss an 
interesting theory that seeks to demonstrate that universal jurisdiction does 
not undermine the current system.  
Anthony Sammons’ article discusses the proposal that the principle of 
universal jurisdiction has indeed been under-theorised, which has indeed led 
to a loss of legitimacy in its application. 
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Sammons refers to the sheer quantity of war criminals, as an example, as 
illustrative of the need for national courts to retain jurisdiction, because a 
State is not acting correctively if it fails to redress the imbalance of justice 
in serious cases. Therefore, in order to legitimise the application of the 
principle, Sammons describes state sovereignty as analogous to a bundle of 
sticks. In other words, sovereignty is an amalgamation of rights.200    
He claims that states are increasingly subject to international validation of 
their government201 and that due to international law which imposes 
obligations that a state must meet continuously in order to maintain 
legitimacy under the international system. He qualifies this further by 
stating that the norms that recognise a State’s sovereign rights with regard to 
the internal population are not absolute, which in turn implies that States are 
always subject to international oversight.202 
    
Sammons places the idea of sovereignty within the context of transferable 
authority; if sovereignty is able to pass from one state to another as occurred 
to German sovereignty after World War II, then that sovereignty should be 
able to pass to the international community. Within the bundle of sticks 
analogy previously alleged, criminal justice as a concept is a notion that can 
also be passed internationally.    
The reason, without such international intervention, is that war criminal are 
able to take advantage of fora where there is an absence of a legitimate 
criminal justice system that can or will prosecute their actions; a criticism I 
have already stated to be represented in the current model of International 
law.  
In the face of the unlikelihood of prosecution, Sammons claims that the 
State ceases to act like a true sovereign and therefore its territory becomes 
analogous to terra nullius203. He claims that this is the exact basis of the lack 
of evolution of the principle. He states that most commentators in response 
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to the question as to the reasons for the existence of universal jurisdiction 
claim that it is because of the nature of the crime, which effectively, makes 
little sense.  
Instead, as Sammons states, universal jurisdiction arises from a State’s 
incapacity to punish the perpetrators themselves, thus it is not the heinous 
nature of the crime which is the basis of universal jurisdiction but rather that 
that aspect of state’s sovereignty has been passed to the international 
community and in that respect, the remaining vacuum is analogous to terra 
nullius.204    
He continues to state that conceding a part of sovereignty to international 
mechanisms seems logical. Indeed, it is commonly accepted that when a 
state cannot meet its obligations vis-à-vis its citizens, those citizens have the 
right to ask the international community.  This would be an effective way of 
addressing justice imbalances. Thus, according to Sammons, for the 
principle to function correctly, its basis must arise from the terra nullius 
basis required for piracy.    
The word heinous for Sammons therefore is only a factor that indicates a 
transfer of sovereignty and acts as a barometer.205 For example, the reason 
for which crimes classified as Jus Cogens norms are classified as such is 
because they threaten all mankind, are peremptory and are therefore higher 
on the barometer.  In other words, where the threat to justice is higher, the 
argument for a transfer of sovereignty to the international community is also 
higher.  
If it can be accepted that the right to universal jurisdiction belongs squarely 
to the international community, it is arguable that when a State proceeds 
with prosecution, it acts as the de facto agent for the international 
community.  In this respect, the idea of objective ideology is seen to be split. 
A State can objectively promote its own ideology, but citizens have the 
ability to enact correctional justice through accountability by looking to an 
international objectivity transcending the justice system of the State, when 
their idea of morality is systematically destroyed.  
                                                
204 Where territory does not belong to a State, any State can assert jurisdiction. See further; 
http://definitions.uslegal.com/t/terra-nullius/   
205 Sammons (n 199) 
 77 
 
Of course, this is only applicable where the violation of individual values is 
so high, that the only way to address the justice imbalance is to enact penal 
sanctions.  
 
As previously stated, however, the concept of universal jurisdiction, as well 
as international adjudication in general represents a post facto correction of 
justice misalignment, which is not the aim of this paper.  
The aim of this paper was to present a tool from which just laws could be 
promulgated in a distributive sense, rather than a correctional sense.  
 
Justice in this sense should not constitute an ‘afterthought’ where tools for 
justice only are applicable after justice violations have been committed.  
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6 Answering the Justice 
Problem 
Before I discuss a possible conclusion, albeit incomplete, I will advance the 
theory that I find most suited to answering the questions that this paper has 
inevitably given rise to. I remain faithful to my assertion that we need to 
move away from the universality and cultural relativism debate, according 
weight to Cass Sunstein’s argument that we cannot find consensus in a 
world where there is so much dissent.206 I instead advocate a much wider 
reading of universalism. A universalism where, faced with the realities of a 
State-centric justice system, we are forced to concede some form of 
objectivity to moral choices in our behaviour towards each other in order to 
function as society.  
 
Continued debate on universalist against culturally relevant versions of 
justice does nothing to add to debate. It is for that reason that I find 
Sunstein’s critique of Rawls and proposal of a theory of incomplete 
theorisation of justice to be most attractive. 207 
 
I have demonstrated in this paper, that there is vast academic and political 
discourse surrounding how best to ensure our society is just, and because of 
its pertinence, academics and practitioners alike have poured over 
usefulness and quality in determining arguments that allow us to be more 
just in the way each State governs society. I have demonstrated, in effect 
that the theory to which we subscribe is too much. It effectively over-
theorises the concept.208 
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In his work on incomplete theorisation, Sunstein advances the view that we 
must have an overall framework that allows us to be take into account 
cultural differences but at the same time does not try to find a point of 
convergence on each of the differences that we encounter. In Sunstein’s own 
words, ‘incomplete theorisation is at a practical and moral level more suited 
to a world of diverse plurality.’209 His comparison is made to complete 
theories. The Rawlsian understanding of justice for example, is a complete 
theory because it attempts to answer every question posed, and in doing, so 
is forced into the abstract.  
Judges, he says, already work in this manner. They don’t take into account 
every principle and theory as that would be impossible. Instead they work 
on the basis of agreed principles.  
 
In Langlois’s critique of Rawls and Sunstein, he makes the assertion that 
‘justice is done by recognising the impossibility of a utopian original 
position, and instead we should strive for virtuous political opinion.’210 
This is liberalism in its most modern form.  
 
For Sunstein, an incomplete theory of justice does exactly what it says on 
the tin. It allows flexibility without have to find commensurability on every 
single point of difference. He says, ‘When the authoritative rationale for the 
result is disconnected from abstract theories of the good, or the right, the 
losers can submit to legal obligations, even if reluctantly without forced to 
renounce their largest ideals.’ And in comparison to complete theories, 
Sunstein argues that ‘incomplete theorisation is the way in which a society 
deals with moral and ethical issues, such developments are able to occur 
without having to shatter a rigid and calcified theoretical structure at each 
juncture.’211 Complete theorisation, he argues means that every particularity 
must be derived from a total theory.  
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Although prima facie, it seems that Sunstein’s theory looks towards finding 
a common good, he explains that his theory is very different from the 
Rawlsian tradition. His theory where there is disagreement prefers to move 
towards particularity, attempting to obtain a consensus on a concrete 
outcome among people who do not want to turn to political philosophy. The 
Rawlsian tradition however asks us to look more into the abstract when 
there is disagreement. I have demonstrated that his usage of overlapping 
consensus and due reflection aim to circumvent disagreement. This is not 
what Sunstein’s theory advocates.  
 
Although Sunstein’s theory is undoubtedly persuasive, Langlois is correct 
when he notes that even in incomplete theorisation, the fact remains that 
people will still not agree on the particularities of behaviour, which could 
pose a major problem in any reconceptualisation of justice.212  
 
The problem of cultural diversity remains. Historically, cultural diversity 
both domestic and inter-state has always been an intrinsic aspect in 
understanding the nature of a domestic legal system. In court cases, the 
identity of the litigant was relevant as the judge could apply different rules 
depending on the identity and personality of the person before him.213 The 
destruction of the multi-normative approach and the resulting modern 
centralist approach to law has developed largely where a unified law 
became the crucial component for the building of a nation state. Justifiably 
therefore a modern day centralised state based system of law isn’t able to 
perform all the functions required of it.214  
 
Moving away from State-based objective criteria for justice and looking to 
another normative system, as David Nelken argues, can perform the 
beneficial task of highlighting justice faults in one own legal system.215 In 
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other words observing another culture’s criteria for, and implementation of 
legal norms can reveal vast amounts about the legal system itself, and 
perhaps more favourably, can invariably reveal lacunae in the host nation’s 
own system of justice regulation. However, what is essential for Nelken, is 
that the method of comparison not be reductive in nature.216 A simple, yet 
crude method of comparison, which Nelken terms as functional 
equivalence217, wrongly assumes that the observer from one legal system 
can look to another legal system and without detailed reflection, be capable 
of recognising the similarities and differences let alone go as far as 
understanding what it is that is distinctive about legal norms in the observed 
State.  
This is an example of where complete theorisation at a level higher than the 
State based model leads to failure. 
 
It should be recognised therefore that we must move away from over 
theorising a notion of justice. We do not live in a reality whereby there can 
be an original position, where our attributes can be fairly divided or where 
every single tradition and culture can be represented. For this reason, I 
support that the first criteria for reconceptualising a notion of justice should 
be the notion of pragmatism. We need to make justice a tool to be useful 
for States, rather than an artefact that is premised on impossible theory. 
Rawlsian theory is undoubtedly useful. He makes an attempt to provide us 
with an accurate narrative of attempting to find convergence in a morally 
divided world.  
In this respect, in a liberal society, there seems to be no authoritative way of 
reconciling liberty and equality. In other words, there is not only one 
conception of morality but rather various incommensurable values. If there, 
it can be agreed upon that these values cannot be realised at the same, it 
must lead us to the understanding that the Finnis’ perfect instantiation of 
‘just’ law does not exist as there will always be collisions between the 
values that people hold important. 
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However, morality is, in my opinion, also a key aspect to the 
reconceptualization of justice. Without it, we can say that unjust law in the 
positivist sense is valid. Justice has a lot to do with morality. If it did not, 
oppressive dictatorships can be legitimised. We require some form of 
morally evaluative criteria in order to establish a law is just.  However, it 
would be more coherent to make a claim that there is no moral truth but 
instead preferences that are relative to each culture. 
 
However pragmatic we remain however, I still maintain that we must strive 
to move away from the State dominated system for providing justice. 
Groups whose values are destroyed simply have no recourse to ensuring 
their traditions or ideologies are represented. We must move away from the 
presupposition as territoriality that reductively requires States to promote 
one ideology in order to maintain stability.  
 
For that reason, I feel that some international concept of justice should 
maintain its force. If that is to be in the form of human rights, under 
theorising would ensure that a framework be made operable in order to 
ensure the workability of the human rights regime without overstepping 
relativist limits.  
 
In promoting international intervention, we must not either reductively state 
that each tradition’s ideologies are incommensurate with another tradition’s. 
Through toleration, we simply ARE able to agree on the basic fundamentals 
that make a States ideology just. We must not fall into the trap of irrational 
nationalism218 where values we stereotypically associate with a State 
become the control mechanism to halt any agreement.  
 
                                                
218 Hans Rosling, 'Hans Rosling: ‘No Such Thing As Swedish Values’ - The Local' 
(Thelocal.se, 2015) <http://www.thelocal.se/20150513/hans-rosling-im-an-ambassador-for-
the-world-in-sweden-connectsweden-tlccu> accessed 23 May 2015 
 
 83 
It is for that reason that I propose that in any international objective 
standard, it must not be overbearing. For this reason I find Sunstein’s 
theory most useful. The international objective standard must act merely as 
a control mechanism for arbitrary uses of State centric power to enact a 
certain moral sovereignty. Sunstein’s theory allows us to create this 
framework of agreed norms and still maintain some manoeuvrability in 
terms of not disavowing groups or traditions of having their traditions take 
into account. Indeed, an a prior system of overview that allows us to decide 
different levels of objectivity, such as the post facto system of universal 
jurisdiction would be useful, allowing us to intervene where a State 
ideology is destructive.  
 
We must equally, avoid arbitrariness. Not every tradition should be assigned 
value. To do so, as I have previously stated would be to undermine a useful 
theory of justice. For that reason, flexibility is another key aspect of 
redefining a notion of justice. It must be capable of taking into account 
changes in the way groups and traditions are viewed to enable our 
lawmakers to provide the best conditions possible for groups of individuals 
to live together in a cohesive society.  
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7 Concluding Remarks 
To make any conclusion, must be considered whether it is even possible to 
answer the problem postulated at the beginning of this paper. Are we even 
in a position, empirically to redesign a notion of justice so global that it can 
be applied to each and every culture, but at the same time ensure that the 
individual legal culture of each society is respected and maintained. It is, as 
I have submitted, a task incapable of achievement in a relatively short 
discussion on the merits of the current theoretical and empirical questions 
surrounding the best and most effective method for providing a just system 
for each country. 
 
Any reconceptualisation of a theory of justice however should be about 
equality, fairness, stability and allowing for cultures where we tolerate each 
other on the points we don’t converge and let the points of agreement form 
the basis of an minimum international normative framework on which we 
can agree, and which oppressive regimes can use as a tool for change. We 
must also implement effective correctional mechanisms for when the 
framework on which we agree are not adhered to. It is only through 
achieving these goals will we be able to ensure that our system remains just 
but not overbearing, allowing each individual to live his life in a way that 
his sense of justice; the sense that I spoke about in the opening lines of this 
paper can be respected, ensured, and ultimately maintained. In a world 
where the importance of providing a just and society in which we live is 
paramount, surely ensuring some sort of overall common control of that can 
only be a positive and useful advancement.  
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